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Comments
The Constitutionality of
Ohio's Death Penalty
In July 1976, the Supreme Court of the United States decided
that the punishment of death is not in and of itself a cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution.! The Court went on, however, to de-
cide that the method for determining which convicted criminals are
to suffer the death penalty must conform to certain standards in order
to escape constitutional infirmity. The Court held permissible those
death penalty schemes that require the determination to be made on
the basis of explicit guidelines, which focus on the particular charac-
teristics of the defendant and of the crime for which he stands con-
victed.2  But the Court struck down mandatory death penalty
schemes. The Court warned, however, that each death penalty
scheme must be individually examined and its constitutionality indi-
vidually decided.
4
In November 1976, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that "Ohio's
statutory framework N  for the imposition of capital punishment is con-
stitutional and does not impose cruel and unusual punishment with-
in the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. 6 In reaching that conclu-
I. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169, 187 (1976). The eighth amendment reads:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. COST. amend. VIII. It is applicable against the states through
the fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
2. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976). Proffitt v. Florida. 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
3. Stanislaus Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976). The Court declined to express an opinion on the constitutionality of a statute
providing for a mandatory death penalty for those convicted or a narrow category of homicide.
for example, murder by a prisoner serving a life sentence. Woodson v. North Carolina. 428
U.S. at 287 n.7. The Court, however, has since held that certain such statutory provisions are
unconstitutional. Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, 97 S. Ct. 1993 (1977). held that a mandatory
death penalty for the intentional killing of an on-duty peace officer violates the eighth amend-
ment. But the Court again reserved the issue of mandatory death sentences for prisoners
serving life sentences. Id. at 1996 n.5. Other recent cases dealing iAith mandator% death
penalties include Washington v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 906 (1976). and Wetmore v. North Caro-
lina, 428 U.S. 905 (1976).
4. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976).
5. Osno REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.02-.04 (Page 1975).
6. State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St. 2d 73, 87, 357 N.E.2d 1035, 1046 (1976). Barless mas the
first case decided by the Ohio Supreme Court in which the court discussed the constitutionality
of Ohio's death penalty scheme. Other cases dealing with the eighth amendment issue and
other constitutional challenges are: State v. Shelton, 51 Ohio St. 2d 68, 364 N.E.2d 1152
(1977); State v. Downs, 51 Ohio St. 2d 47, 364 N.E.2d 1140 (1977). State v. Jackson. 50 Ohio
St. 2d 253, 364 N.E.2d 236 (1977); State v. Weind, 50 Ohio St. 2d 224, 364 N.E.2d 224 (1977).
State v. Carl Osborne, 50 Ohio St. 2d 211, 364 N.E.2d 216 (1977); State v. Miller, 49 Ohio
St. 2d 198, 361 N.E.2d 419 (1977); State v. Alberta Osborne, 49 Ohio St. 2d 135. 359 N.E.2d
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sion, however, the court dealt inadequately and unconvincingly with
some very difficult constitutional problems presented by Ohio's death
penalty statutes. The court's determination merits consideration,
because the court failed to articulate adequate support for it, and
because the lives of those convicted of a capital crime in Ohio depend
on whether that determination can be supported. In the near future,
the court's determination will receive that consideration, for the Su-
preme Court of the United States is reviewing to hear the cases of two
Ohio defendants whose death sentences were recently affirmed by the
Ohio Supreme Court.
This Comment will analyze the Ohio Supreme Court's defense of
the constitutionality of Ohio's death penalty scheme in light of the con-
stitutional standards for the imposition of the death sentence recently
articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States. The analysis
will point out the weaknesses and deficiencies of the Ohio Supreme
Court's treatment of the issues raised by Ohio's death penalty stat-
utes, and consider in greater depth whether the statutes indeed con-
form with eighth amendment standards.
Ohio's death penalty scheme presents a number of other consti-
tutional problems which, although not directly related to the eighth
amendment issues addressed by the United States Supreme Court in
Gregg and the allied cases, must nevertheless be considered in assess-
ing the scheme's constitutionality. The problems concern the right to
a jury trial and the allocation of the burden of proving mitigation.
This Comment will consider these related constitutional problems
and assess the Ohio Supreme Court's resolution of them in light of
the applicable constitutional principles set forth by the Supreme Court
of the United States.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR THE
IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE
A. Furman v. Georgia8
In Furman v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court ad-
78 (1976); State v. Lane, 49 Ohio St. 2d 77, 358 N.E.2d 1081 (1976): State v. Sandra Lockett,
49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 358 N.E.2d 1062 (1976), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 261 (1977); State v.
Edwards, 49 Ohio St. 2d 31, 358 N.E.2d 1051 (1976); State v. Perryman, 49 Ohio St. 2d 14,
358 N.E.2d 1040 (1976); State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St. 2d 391, 358 N.i.2d 623 (1976); State v.
Royster, 48 Ohio St. 2d 381, 358 N.E.2d 616 (1976); State v. Harris, 48 Ohio St. 2d 351, 359
N.E.2d 67 (1976); State v. Hall, 48 Ohio St. 2d 325, 358 N.E.2d 590 (1976); State v. Bell, 48
Ohio St. 2d 270, 358 N.E.2d 556 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 2971 (1977); State v. Black, 48
Ohio St. 2d 262, 358 N.E.2d 551 (1976); State v. Hancock, 48 Ohio St 2d 147, 358 N.E,2d 273
(1976); State v. Woods, 48 Ohio St. 2d 127, 357 N.E.2d 1059 (1976), petition for cert filed, 45
U.S.L.W. 3696 (U.S. March 21, 1977) (No. 76-1308); State v. Strodes. 48 Ohio St. 2d 113, 357
N.E.2d 375 (1976).
7. State v. Sandra Lockett, 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 358 N.E.2d 1062 (1976), cert. granted, 98
S. Ct. 261 (1977); State v. Bell, 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 358 N.E.2d 551 (1976), cert. granted, 97
S. Ct. 2971 (1977).
8. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). For a discussion of the Court's decision, see The Supreme Court,
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dressed the question whether the sentence of death itself could con-
stitute a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments.9 Although the per curiam decision held only
"that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these
cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,"' the reasoning contained in
the separate opinions of the five justices concurring in the decision"1
necessarily had an impact on many other defendants awaiting execu-
tion. The opinions ranged so broadly that the ultimate fate of capital
punishment in the United States after Furman could indeed have
been said to be in an "uncertain limbo. ' 12  Two persons reading the
opinions in the case could have reached polar conclusions about the
issue: one might have legitimately speculated that the Court would
ultimately hold the death penalty itself unconstitutionally cruel and
unusual, 13 and another that only mandatory death penalty schemes
1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REv. 76-85 (1972). Other literature discussing Furman includesz
Goldberg, The Death Penalty and the Supreme Court, 15 ARIM L. REv. 355 (1973): Junker.
The Death Penalty Cases: A Preliminary Comment, 48 WAS!!. L. RE'. 95 (1972); Tao. Betnd
Furman v. Georgia: The Need for a Morally Based Decision on Capital Punishment, 51 Nota
DAME LAW. 722 (1976); Vance, The Death Penalty After Furman, 48 NOTRE DvtE L%%% 850
(1973); Wollan, The Death Penalty After Furman, 4 Loy. Cm. U.L.J. 339 (1973): Comment.
Furman v. Georgia: A Postmortem on the Death Penalty. 18 VILL L. REV. 678 (1973); Note.
The Death Penalty-The Alternatives Left After Furman v. Georgia. 37 ALB. L RE,. 344 11973):
Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes. 87 H %R%. L°
REV. 1690 (1974); Note, Capital Punishment Statutes After Furman. 35 Ohio Sr. LJ. 651 J 1974):
Note, Furman v. Georgia-Deathknell .for Capital Punishment?. 47 ST. Joitxs L. RE%. 107
(1972); 23 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 172 (1974); 47 TuL. L. REV. 1167 (1973); 42 U. Ct,. L. RE%, 172
(1973).
9. In prior cases, the Supreme Court had dealt with ancillary issues regarding the death
penalty, such as the method used to inflict death. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Francis %.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah. 99
U.S. 130 (1879). The Court also passed on the procedures for determining %hich of those con-
victed of a capital crime would be punished by death. McGautha v. California. 402 U.S. 183.
185 (1971) (The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is not violated %hen "the
decision whether a defendant should live or die [is] left to the absolute discretion of the jury.).
Each of these decisions is premised on the assumption that death is a constitutionally
permissible punishment Indeed, in In re Kemmler, the Court stated that "the punishment of
death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution." 136 U.S.
at 447. The Court felt that an unconstitutionally "cruel" punishment involved "something more
than the mere extinguishment of life." Ld. (emphasis added).
10. 408 U.S. at 239-40 (emphasis added). The grant of certiorari had likewise been
limited to the question: "Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in [these
cases] constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments?" 403 U.S. 952 (1971). Furman was decided together with Jackson .v Georgia
and Branch v. Texas. Furman had been convicted of murder, Branch and Jackson of rape.
11. The five justices concurring in the judgment were Douglas, Brennan. Stemart. White,
and Marshall. None joined in the opinion of any other. The dissenting justices were Black-
mun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger. Each filed a separate opinion in uhich.
except for the opinion of Justice Blackmun, all the dissenting justices joined.
12. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 403 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
13. A careful head count of the justices in Furman, however, indicates that. absent a
change of personnel or of heart, such a conclusion might not be reached. The four dissenters
certainly would not agree with such a holding, and Justice White. for one, strongly intimated
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would survive judicial scrutiny.' 4
After the decision in Furman, state courts and legislatures in
particular were faced with the challenging task of sifting through the
voluminous opinions of the majority in order to determine what con-
stitutional standards would in the future govern the validity of death
penalty statutes.'5 A careful reading of the opinions, however, re-
veals that, despite the disparity of their reasoning, the justices of the
majority relied either partly or wholly on the perception that the tat-
utes under consideration permitted the death penalty to be arbitrarily
and/or discriminatorily inflicted.
Focusing on the fact that the death penalty was infrequently im-
posed and that the statutes involved provided no standards for choos-
ing between death and imprisonment as a penalty in any given case,
the justices reasoned that the statutes sanctioned a capricious selec-
tion of defendants for capital punishment. Under such statutes, a
defendant convicted of a capital crime could be sentenced to die for
any reason, or for no reason. In the words of Justice Brennan:
When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number of
the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually ines-
capable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of little
more than a lottery system. . . . When the rate of infliction is at this
low level, it is highly implausible that only the worst criminals or the
criminals who commit the worst crimes are selected for this punish-
ment.16
that he did not feel death is a constitutionally impermissible penalty under all circumstances:
The facial constitutionality of statutes requiring the imposition of the death penalty
for first-degree murder, for more narrowly defined categories of murder, or for rape
would present quite different issues under the Eighth Amendment than are posed by the
cases before us. In joining the Court's judgments, therefore, I do not at all intimate
that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se or that there is no system of capital
punishment that would comport with the Eighth Amendment.
408 U.S. at 310-11 (White, J., concurring). Justice White, along with Justice Rehnquist and
Chief Justice Burger, concurred in Gregg v. Georgia, which upheld Georgia's death penalty
scheme.
14. A survey of the opinions in Furman indicates that a mandatory death penalty would
present a close question. Justices Brennan and Marshall at least among the majority would
be opposed to such a scheme, and Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun among the
dissenters indicated disfavor for that type of penalty. See, e.g., 408 U S. at 402 (Burger, C.J,.
dissenting): "I could more easily be persuaded that mandatory sentences of death, without the
intervening and ameliorating impact of lay jurors, are so arbitrary and doctrinaire that they
violate the Constitution." Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blaekmun, however, later
dissented in Woodson v. North Carolina, Stanislaus Roberts v. Louisiana, and Harry Roberts v,
Louisiana, in which mandatory death penalty schemes were struck down.
15. See, e.g., Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Capital Punishment: Legislative
Implications of United States Supreme Court Decision in Furman v. Georgia, Staff Research
Report No. 107 (1972). It suggested two approaches to the problem of Interpreting Furman,
One approach was to analyze the opinions of the three justices who declined to reach the
broader question of the death penalty's per se constitutionality, since tyke votes of these justices
were vital to the judgment. The other approach suggested was to isolate and analyze the factors
common to the majority's opinions.
16. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 293, 294 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). The con-
stitutional test employed by Justice Brennan reflected "[tlhe primary principle , . . that a
punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings." Id. at 271.
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Justice Stewart noted: "For of all the people convicted of rapes and
murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the pe-
titioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom
the sentence of death has in fact been imposed.: 17  Justice White's
view was in the same vein: "[T]he death penalty is exacted with great
infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and . .. there is no
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed
from the many in which it is not."'18
Such statutes not only permitted the death sentence to be inflicted
randomly, but discriminatorily as well. Justice Douglas focused on
the circumstance that sentencing authorities under such statutes were
free to use any basis for granting or withholding mercy, including such
factors as race or social status.
Yet we know that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the
death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prej-
udices against the accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking politi-
cal clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and sav-
ing those who by social position may be in a more protected position.' 9
In a footnote, Justice Douglas stated: "[T]he Leopold and Loebs, the
Harry Thaws, the Dr. Sheppards and the Dr. Finchs of our society
are never executed, only those in the lower strata, only those who are
members of an unpopular minority or the poor and despised."" Jus-
tice Marshall also recognized that the opportunity for discrimination
along racial or other lines was given maximum play in statutes such
as those reviewed in Furman.21
The test to determine whether a given punishment complies with that principle was defined
as follows: "It is a denial of human dignity for the State arbitrarily to subject a person to an
unusually severe punishment that society has indicated it does not regard as acceptable, and
that cannot be shown to serve any penal purpose more effectively than a significantly less
drastic punishment." Id. at 286. The punishment of death, according to Justice Brennan. is
cruel and unusual under that test.
17. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). Justice Stewart "simply
conclude[d] that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a
sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and
so freakishly imposed." Id. at 310.
18. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). Justice White concluded: "[A]s the statutes before
us are now administered, the [death] penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat of
execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice." Id. According to
Justice White, "[a] penalty with such negligible returns to the State would be patently ex-
cessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 312.
19. Id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 248 n.10 (Douglas, J., concurring).
21. Justice Marshall noted that "capital punishment is imposed discriminatorily against
certain identifiable classes of people." Id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring). He added: "Ra-
cial or other discriminations should not be surprising. In McGautha v. California ..... this
Court held 'that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce
life or death in capital cases is [not] offensive to anything in the Constitution.' This was an
open invitation to discrimination." Id. at 365. Justice Marshall concluded that the death
penalty is excessive because it does not fulfill valid legislative purposes better than other
punishments, id at 342-59, and that it is "morally unacceptable to the people of the United
States at this time in their history," id at 360.
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Thus, every justice of the majority felt that the arbitrary and/or
discriminatory manner in which the penalty of death was imposed
under the statutes at hand was responsible for, or at least contributed
to, the unconstitutionality of those statutes. At the very least then, the
Court seemed to be indicating that a death penalty statute, in order
to survive constitutional attack, must somehow guide the discretion
of the sentencing authority in deciding whether or not to impose cap-
ital punishment, so as to avoid arbitrary or discriminatory sentencing."
That this was the thrust of Furman became apparent in Gregg v.
Georgia.
B. Gregg v. Georgia and the Allied CasesY
3
After the Court's decision in Furman, many legislatures attempted
to draft death penalty statutes that would comply with Furman's
.24 t setnelgsa
mandate. Many states enacted mandatory death sentence legisla-
tion, thereby removing all discretion from the hands of the sentencing
authority.25  Other states chose to retain some discretion in the sen-
tencing scheme, but channeled that discretion by including standards
to guide the sentencing authority in its life or death decision.26 The
22. This message rests uncomfortably with the Court's prior holding in McGautha v,
California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), discussed at note 9 supra. Several justices commented on
the apparent inconsistency. See, e.g., note 21 supra. Chief Justice Burger stated:
Although the Court's decision in MeGautha was technically confined to the dictates
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth
Amendment as made applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it would be disingenuous to suggest that today's ruling has
done anything less than overrule McGautha in the guise of an Eighth Amendment
adjudication.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 400 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Court later acknowledged
that Furman had severely limited McGautha's holding. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 195 n.47.
23. For a discussion of the Court's decisions, see The Supreme Court, 1975 Term. 90
HARV. L. REV. 63-76 (1976), Other literature dealing with Gregg and the allied cases in-
cludes: Black, Due Process for Death: Jurek v. Texas and Companion Cases, 26 CATIII, U.L
REV. 1 (1976): England, Capital Punishment in the Light of Constitutional Evolution: An
Analysis of the Distinctions Between Furman and Gregg, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 596 (1977);
Tao. The Constitutional Status of Capital Punishment: An Analysis of Gregg, Jurck, and Wood-
son, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 345 (1977); Comment, Resurrection ol Capital Punishment- - 7he
1976 Death Penalty Cases, 81 DIcK. L. REV. 543 (1977); Commert, Death Penalty Statutes:
A Post-Gregg v. Georgia Survey and Discussion of Eighth Amendment Safeguards, 16 WAS1H-
BURN L.J. 497 (1977); Note, Gregg v. Georgia: The Search .for the Civilized Standard. 1976
DET. C. L. REV. 645 (1976): Note, Capital Punishment: A Review of Recent Supretne Court
Decisions, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 261 (1976); Note, Constitutional Law-Capital Puninhment
and the Eighth Amendment, 51 TUL. L. REV. 360 (1977); 8 TEX. TEI. L. REV. 515 (1976).
24. At the time Gregg was decided, at least thirty-five states had enacted new death
penalty statutes. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 n.23 (1977). Congress had also enacted
a criminal law providing for a death penalty. Antihijacking Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. § 1472
(i), (n) (Supp. IV 1974). See generally Note, Capital Punishment Statutes After Furman. 35
OHIO ST. L.J. 651 at 670-84 (1974).
25. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4209 (Cum. Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE § 18-4004
(Cum. Supp. 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West 1974); Mk, CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-19.
97-3-21, 97-25-55 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 559.005, 559.009 (Vernon Supp,
1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
26. See, e.g., ALA, CODE tit. 15 §§ 342(3)-342(9) (Interim Supp. 1975): AR I, REv, SIru,
ANN. §§ 13-452 to 13-454 (Supp. 1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1301 to 41-1304, 414706 (Ark,
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United States Supreme Court eventually was called upon to decide
whether several such statutes achieved what in theory they were de-
signed to achieve-compliance with the eighth amendment standards
contained in Furman.
In Gregg v. Georgia, Georgia's new death penalty scheme, en-
acted after its old scheme was effectively scrapped by Furman,2  was
subjected to scrutiny. This time the Supreme Court upheld the stat-
ute's constitutionality. In cases handed down at the same time, the
Court likewise upheld the death penalty statutes of Florida 28 and
Texas,29 but struck down those of North Carolina3" and Louisiana.3
In Gregg and the cases decided along with it, the Supreme Court 32
made clear that death is a constitutionally permissible punishment, at
least for the crime of murder.33 In arriving at this conclusion, the
Crim. Code 1975); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1, 209, 219 (West Supp. 1974); CONN. G . STT.
ANN. §§ 53a-46a, 53a-54b (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 782.04. 921.141 (Cum. Supp, 1975-76):
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3102, 27-2528, 27-2534.1, 27-2537 (Supp. 1975); TEX. PENAL CODE Avi.
4 19.03(a) (Vernon 1974).
27. For cases dealing with Furnan's effect on Georgia's death penalty scheme, see, Watson
v. State, 229 Ga. 787, 194 S.E.2d 407 (1972); Mitchell v. Smith, 229 Ga. 781, 194 S.E.2d 414
(1972); Sullivan v. State, 229 Ga. 731, 194 S.E.2d 410 (1972).
28. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
29. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
30. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
31. Stanislaus Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
32. Gregg, Proffli, and Jurek were all 7-2 decisions. Justice Steu art %rote an opinion
in Gregg, Justice Powell in Proffitt, and Justice Stevens in Jurek, with each justice joining in
the opinions of the other two. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, White, and Black-
mun concurred in each case, with the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist joining in an opinion
written by Justice White. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented in each case. Therefore. no
opinion commanded a majority or even a plurality of the Court.
The concurring opinions written by Justice White, however, stress the same points as
the Stewart-Stevens-Powell opinions, particularly with regard to the decision in Furman.
The difference between the opinions is primarily that in Gregg Justice Stew.art articulated in
some detail an eighth amendment test for determining the constitutionality of death penalty
statutes, while Justice White's only reference to eighth amendment standards %as to Furnians
denunciation of arbitrary sentencing. Justice White, however, wrote the opinion in a subse-
quent case that utilized the constitutional test set out by Justice Stewart in Gregg. Coker
v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2865-66 (1977). References in this Comment, therefore, are gen-
erally to the opinions of Justices Stewart, Stevens, or Powell.
Woodson and Stanislaus Roberts were 5-4 decisions. Once again, Justices Po%%ell. Stctens.
and Stewart joined in opinions authored by Justice Stewart and Justice Stesens respecticly.
Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred separately. Justices White. Blackmun, Rehnquist.
and Chief Justice Burger dissented, with the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist joining in an
opinion written by Justice White. References are generally to the Po'sell-Steart-Stcens
opinions. (Recently, the Court in Harry Roberts v. Louisiana. 97 S. Ct. 1993 (1977). struck
down a mandatory death penalty on the authority of Woodson and Stanislaus Roberts in a 5-4
per curiam decision.)
33. The petitioner in each of these five cases had been convicted of. and sentenced to
death for, the crime of murder. The Supreme Court explicitly stated that its views pertained
only to the appropriateness of death as punishment for murder.
We do not address here the question whether the taking of the criminal's life is a
proportionate sanction where no victim has been deprived of life-for example. %%hen
capital punishment is imposed for rape, kidnapping, or armed robbery that does not re-
sult in the death of any human being.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 n.35 (1976). The Supreme Court has since struck do%%n the
use of the death penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman. Coker v. Georgia. 97 S. Ct.
2861 (1977).
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Court proceeded through a two-step analysis. The Court prefaced its
analysis by noting that although the eighth amendment was designed
primarily to proscribe various barbarous forms of punishment, 14 its
meaning has not been so confined. Instead, the eighth amendment
"has been interpreted in a flexible and dynamic manner.' 3  The cruel
and unusual punishments clause has been said to "acquire meaning
as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice. 36  In-
deed, far from being static, the eighth amendment "must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the prog-
ress of a maturing society." a  Therefore, step one of the Court's ana-
lysis involved "an assessment of contemporary values concerning the
infliction of [the] challenged sanction. 3 8  That assessment was made
by "look[ing] to objective indicia that reflect the public attitude to-
ward [the] given sanction. 39
The Court's view of the objective evidence before it led to the
conclusion that capital punishment is not morally unacceptable to the
American people at the present stage of the nation's history. The
Court relied on the fact that at least thirty-five states re-enacted40 ,
death penalties after Furman, and that juries-"a significant and re-
liable index of contemporary values"4t -imposed capital punishment
with some frequency after Furman.42  Moreover, in "the only state-
wide referendum occurring since Furman" of which the Court was
aware, "the people of California adopted a constitutional amendment
that authorized capital punishment, in effect negating a prior ruling
by the Supreme Court of California."
43
34. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 316-22 (Marshall. J, concurring),
Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted." The Or vinal Afeaning, 57 CALIF.
L. REV. 839 (1969).
35. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976).
36. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). In We..ms, the Court held that
the punishment of cadena temporal-a punishment involving imprisonment for at least twelve
years and one day in chains at hard and painful labor, loss of civil liberties, and lifelong sur-
veillance- was so out of proportion to the crime of falsifying an official document that it consti-
tuted a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Philippine bill af rights,
37. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). In Trop, the Court held that a federal statute
providing for the forfeiture of the citizenship of a convicted deserter who received a dishonorable
discharge from military service violated the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the eighth
amendment.
38. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
39. Id. See Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2865-68 (1977):
rTlhese Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be. merely the sub-
jective views of individual Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors
to the maximum possible extent. To this end, attention must b , given to the public
attitudes concerning a particular sentence-history and precedent, legislative attitudes.
and the response of juries reflected in their sentencing decisions are to be consulted.
id. at 2865-66.
40. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 179-80.
41. Id. at 181.
42. Id. at 182.
43. Id. at 181. The California Supreme Court had held that state's death penalty
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In step two of its analysis, the Supreme Court pointed out that
"public perceptions of standards of decency with respect to criminal
sanctions are not conclusive," for the "penalty must also accord with
'the dignity of man,' which is the 'basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment.' 44 In order for a penalty to comply with the second
prong of the Court's analysis, it must "not be 'excessive.',,45 The
Court set forth a bifurcated test for excessiveness: "First, the punish-
ment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.
. ..Second, the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion
to the severity of the crime.
" 46
In the Court's view, the punishment of death can meet both
prongs of this test. The Court declined to find that the imposition of
death is "so totally without penological justification that it results in
the gratuitous infliction of suffering." 47  The Court noted that the
death penalty purportedly serves the social purposes of retribution
and general deterrence.48 The Court felt that whether the death pen-
alty serves those purpose or serves them better than less drastic
punishments is a debatable question.49  But, in the absence of con-
vincing data to the contrary, the Court was unwilling to assume that
a legislative determination "that capital punishment may be necessary
in some cases is clearly wrong." 50
Considerations of federalism, as well as respect for the ability of a legis-
lature to evaluate, in terms of its particular State, the moral consensus
statute invalid under the California constitution. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628. 493 P.2d
880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
44. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173. See Coker v. Georgia. 97 S. Ct. 2861. 2868 (1977):
"These recent events evidencing the attitude of state legislatures and sentencing juries do not
wholly determine this controversy, for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under
the Eighth Amendment"
45. 428 U.S. at 173.
46. Id. See Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2865 (1977).
47. 428 U.S. at 183.
48. Id. Of the goal of retribution, the Court said:
"Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law," .. but
neither is it a forbidden objective nor one inconsistent iith our respect for the dignity
of men. . . . Indeed, the decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate
sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's belief that certain
crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate re-
sponse may be the penalty of death.
Id. at 183-84 (footnote omitted).
49. "Statistical attempts to evaluate the worth of the death penalty as a deterrent to
crimes by potential offenders have occasioned a great deal of debate. The results simply have
been inconclusive." Id. at 184-85 (footnote omitted). "Although some of the studies suggest
that the death penalty may not function as a significantly greater deterrent than lesser pen-
alties, there is no convincing empirical evidence either supporting or refuting this view." Id.
at 185 (footnote omitted).
50. Id. at 186.
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concerning the death penalty and its social utility as a sanction, require
us to conclude, in the absence of more convincing evidence, that the in-
fliction of death as a punishment for murder is not without justification
and thus is not unconstitutionally severe.5'
Nor could the Court agree with the petitioners that death is a pun-
ishment disproportionate to the crime of murder: "[W]hen a life has
been taken deliberately by the offender, we cannot say that the punish-
ment is invariably disproportionate to the crime. It is an extreme
sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes.'" 2
The Supreme Court thus decided that death is not itself an uncon-
stitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. The question remained,
however, whether the procedures for determining which convicted
criminals would suffer the ultimate sanction were constitutionally ac-
ceptable. To answer this question, the Court had to turn again to
Furman and articulate the constitutional propositions for which that
case stands.
The petitioners in Gregg and the allied cases in effect argued
that Furman mandated what no system conceived and operated by
human beings could achieve-the complete elimination of every pos-
sibility for arbitrariness in the imposition of the death sentence. The
petitioners urged that no process could eliminate arbitrary results in
the selection of individuals to die because, at all stages of the criminal
justice system, opportunities for discretionary action exist that divert
potential candidates for capital punishment from its ultimate imposi-
tion. 3 The prosecutor's unfettered discretion to charge and to plea
bargain, the jury's discretion to convict on a lesser included offense,
and the governor's discretion to grant executive clemency were al-
leged to be avenues by which an individual could escape capital
punishment even though the facts in his case warranted it. There-
fore, the petitioners argued, arbitrariness was built into the system,
precluding uniform imposition of the death penalty.
The United States Supreme Court rejected this thesis. Believ-
ing the argument to be "based on a fundamental misinterpretation
5 !. Id. at 186-87. The Court further stated:
The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a ccmplex factual issue the
resolution of which properly rests with the legislatures, which can evaluate the result.,
of statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of ap-
proach that is not available to the courts.
Id. at 186.
52. Id. at 187 (footnote omitted). See note 33 supra.
53. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at 18, Gregg v. Georgia. 428 U,S. 153 (1976):
Arbitrary selection operates well before sentencing to spar. a substantial portion
of Georgia capital defendants, although others similarly situated are ultimately sen-
tenced to death. The principal importance of these pre-sentence selective mecha-
nisms is that they provide an arbitrary sparing for all but a relative handful of defen-
dants originally charged with capital crimes.
See generally Note, Capital Punishment Statutes After Furman. 35 O1lo ST. L.J. 651. 652-62
(1974).
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of Furman,"5 4 the Court stated flatly: "Nothing in any of our cases
suggests that the decision to afford an individual defendant mercy
violates the Constitution."5 5 The concern of Furman, the Court felt,
was only the arbitrariness in the sentencing decision, after an individ-
ual had been convicted of a capital crime.
Having decided that the death penalty was an acceptable punish-
ment and that the existence of discretionary "filtering" prior to or
after the sentencing decision does not in itself render the imposition
of death unconstitutionally arbitrary, the Court set forth the criteria
for determining whether a given death penalty statute is constitu-
tionally acceptable. As a starting place for its analysis, the Court
articulated what it felt to be the teaching of Furman: "Furman man-
dates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter
so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken
or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so
as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."
'5 6
In order to achieve an adequate channeling of discretion, the
sentencing authority must be "given guidance regarding the factors
-about the crime and the defendant that the State, representing or-
ganized society, deems particularly relevant to the sentencing deci-
sion. ' 7 To insure that information relevant to the sentencing decision
is not improperly used in the guilt-determining decision, a bifurcated
proceeding-"one in which the question of sentence is not considered
until the determination of guilt has been made"58-was recommended. 59
The three statutes upheld by the Court all provide for a bifurcated
procedure in capital cases, with one part devoted to the determination
of guilt, the other to the selection of sentence. Moreover, each of
the statutes focuses attention on the defendant and the nature of the
crime he committed, either by narrowing the definition of capital
murderi0 or by adopting statutorily defined aggravating circumstances,
54. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 254 (1976).
55. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 199. The Court also stated: "The petitioner's argu-
ment is nothing more than a veiled contention that Furnan indirectly outlawed capital pun-
ishment by placing totally unrealistic conditions on its use." Id. at 199 n.50. Justice White
made the same point: "Petitioner has argued, in effect, that no matter how effective the death
penalty may be as a punishment, government, created and run as it must be by humans, is
inevitably incompetent to administer it. This cannot be accepted as a proposition of constitu-
tional law." Id. at 226 (White, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 189. Justice Whites version was this: "In Furman. this Court held that as a
result of giving the sentencer unguided discretion to impose or not to impose the death penalty
for murder, the penalty was being imposed discriminatorily, wantonly and freakishly, and so
infrequently that any given death sentence was cruel and unusual:' Id. at 220-21 (White. J..
concurring) (footnotes omitted).
57. Id. at 192.
58. Id. at 190-91.
59. Id. at 195.
60. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 1974).
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at least one of which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
before the death penalty can be imposed.6'
Not only particular aggravating circumstances, but also mitigat-
ing circumstances are to be taken into consideration under the three
statutes upheld by the Court. In each statute, the sentencing authority
is authorized to decline to impose the death penalty if the mitigating
circumstances so require.6 2  Thus, the sentencing authority will "con-
sider on the basis of all relevant evidence not only why a death sen-
tence should be imposed, but also why it should not be imposed." 61
Indeed, the failure to permit the sentencing authority to consider
the circumstances in mitigation of the death sentence was held by the
Court to be a violation of the eighth amendment. In Woodson v. North
Carolina and Stanislaus Roberts v. Louisiana, the Court struck down
the death penalty statutes of North Carolina and Louisiana because
they, by making the death sentence mandatory for each individual
convicted of capital murder, failed to "focus on the circumstances of
the particular offense and the character and propensities of the of-
fender., 64 The Court found that mandatory death penalties historically
have been rejected as unduly harsh, and are incompatible with con-
temporary standards concerning the death penalty. Furthermore, the
rigidity of mandatory death penalties encourages juries to violate their
oaths and refuse to convict of capital murder, even though conviction
is warranted by the evidence, in order to avoid imposing the death
sentence. Thus, the mandatory statutes of North Carolina and
Louisiana, rather than alleviating the arbitrary results condemned in
Furman, "simply papered over the problem of unguided and unchecked
jury discretion. 65
Another factor deemed significant by the Court in upholding the
statutes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas was the provision for ap-
pellate review of all cases in which the death sentence had been im-
posed.6 Such review, at least under the Florida and Georgia statutes,
61. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-534.1 (Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (West Supp,
1976-77).
62. For example, the Florida statute sets out seven mitigating circumstances, FLA,
STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6) (West Supp. 1976-77). The jury is to consider after a hearing whether
the aggravating circumstances are outweighed by sufficient mitigating circumstances. If so,
the sentence, which is imposed by the trial judge, would be life imprisonment, unless the trial
judge feels that the facts warranting the death penalty are so clear that no reasonable person
could differ. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1976).
63. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976).
64. Stanislaus Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333 (1976).
65. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302 (1976).
66. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 204-06; id. at 222-24 (White, J., concurring); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. at 276; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 250-51, 253. See Woodson v. North Caro-
lina, 428 U.S. at 303 (referring to Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 204-06).
One is compelled to conclude that, given the importance attvched by the Court to the
existence of appellate review in capital cases, such review is constitutionally required, Indeed,
statewide appellate review would seem to be the only way to avoid the arbitrariness in
sentencing decisions condemned in Furman. (See, e.g., Woodson v, North Carolina, 428 U.S.
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requires the appellate court to determine whether the evidence sup-
ports the jury's sentence of death and whether that sentence is dis-
proportionate in comparison to sentences generally imposed in similar
cases. Thus, "appellate review . . . serves as a check against the
random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. In particular, the
proportionality review substantially eliminates the possibility that a
person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury."67
In sum, then, the Court found that death is an appropriate sanc-
tion for the crime of murder so long as it is not arbitrarily or capri-
ciously imposed. It refused to find that the opportunity for discre-
tionary action makes impossible the administration of a system that
does not unconstitutionally select individuals to die. To minimize
discretion, however, the Court required that the system provide
guidelines to which the sentencing authority must look in making its
life or death decision. The guidelines must be flexible enough to
permit an individualized consideration of the offender and the offense
of which he has been convicted, but not so flexible as to permit an
arbitrary and capricious selection of offenders for the ultimate sanction.
Finally, the system must provide for a uniform self-examination to
make certain that there is indeed some "meaningful basis for dis-
tinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from
the many in which it is not.
68
II. OHIO'S DEATH PENALTY SCHEME AND
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Since the constitutionality of each death penalty scheme must be
independently determined,69 there is no definite way to tell whether
Ohio's statutes conform with eighth amendment standards until they
are reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. A rough index of
how they will fare on review, however, can be gleaned by comparing
Ohio's statutes with those upheld and those struck down in Gregg
and the allied cases. Do the Ohio statutes operate more like a manda-
at 303 (footnote omitted): "And there is no way under the North Carolina law for the judiciary
to check arbitrary and capricious exercise of (the jury's] power (to impose capital punishment]
through a review of death sentences.") Justice Rehnquist, however, noted that appellate
review of criminal cases has generally not been thought to be constitutionally required of the
states: "It is even less clear that any provision of the Constitution can be read to require such
appellate review. If the States wish to undertake such an effort, they are undoubtedly free
to do so, but surely it is not required by the United States Constitution." Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. at 319 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
67. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 206. Indeed, Georgia's Supreme Court had vacated
the death sentence on the robbery counts-of which Gregg had also been convicted, as well as
of murder-on the ground that the death sentences on the robbery counts "are unusual in that
they are rarely imposed for this offense." Gregg v. State, 233 Ga. 117. 127. 210 S.E.2d 659,
667 (1974).
68. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
69. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
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to, y death penalty scheme, or do they permit a consideration "on the
basis of all relevant evidence not only why a death sentence should
be imposed, but also why it should not be imposed?""' Do the Ohio
statutes authorize an adequate appellate review of capital cases? To
answer these questions, a close look at how the Ohio statutes operate
is necessary.
A. The Statutes
Ohio's death penalty statutes71 were enacted in 197272 in light
of the Supreme Court's decision in Furman." Under section 2929.02, 
the crime of aggravated murder75-the only capital crime in Ohio-is
punishable by death or by life imprisonment. The death penalty is
available, however, only when the defendant is found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the principal charge of aggravated murder and at
least one of seven aggravating circumstances. 6 The seven aggravat-
ing circumstances are: assassination of various officials, officials-elect,
70. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976).
71. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.02-.04 (Page 1975).
72. The Ohio death penalty statutes were enacted as part of a major revision of the Ohio
Criminal Code. They did not become effective until January 1, 1974, The former death penalty
statutes were declared unconstitutional under Furman in State v. Leigh, 31 Ohio St. 2d 97, 285
N.E.2d 333 (1972).
73. For a legislative history of the genesis of Ohio's death penalty statutes, see Lehman
& Norris, Some Legislative History and Comments on Ohio's New Criminal Code. 23 City,
ST. L. REV. 8, 15-23 (1974). Mr. Norris and Mr. Lehman were sponsor and cosponsor of House
Bill No. 511 to amend the Ohio Criminal Code.
74. OnIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.02 (Page 1975) reads in relevant part:
2929.02 Penalties for murder
(A) Whoever is convicted of aggravated murder in violation of section 2903.01 of
the Revised Code shall suffer death or be imprisoned for life. as determined pursuant
to sections 2929.03 and 2929.04 of the Revised Code. In addition, the offender may be
fined an amount fixed by the court, but not more than twenty-five thousand dollars,
75. The offense of aggravated murder is defined as follows:
2903.01 Aggravated murder
(A) No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation ond design, cause the
death of another.
(B) No person shall purposely cause the death of another while committing or
attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to
commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson or arson, aggravated robbery or robbery,
aggravated burglary or burglary, or escape.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (Page 1975).
76. Id. § 2929.04(A):
(A) Imposition of the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded, unless
one or more of the following is specified in the indictment or cot nt in the indictment
pursuant to section 2941.14 of the Revised Code, and is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt:
(1) The offense was the assassination of the president of the United States or
person in line of succession to the presidency, or of the governor or lieutenant
governor of this state, or of the president-elect or vice president-elect of the United
States, or of the governor-elect or lieutenant governor-elect of this state, or of a candi-
date for any of the foregoing offices. For the purposes of this division, a person is a
candidate if he has been nominated for election according to law, or if he has filed a
petition or petitions according to law to have his name placed on the ballot in a primary
or general election, or if he campaigns as a write-in candidate in a primary or general
election.
or candidates; murder for hire; murder to escape detection, apprehen-
sion, trial, or punishment for another offense; murder while a prisoner,
repeat murder or multiple murder; murder of a law enforcement officer,
and felony murder.
In the guilt-determining stage, the defendant may be tried by a
jury77 or, if he waives his right to a jury trial,78 by a panel of three
judges.79 The verdict must state whether or not the accused was found
guilty of the principal charge of aggravated murder.80 If the de-
fendant is found guilty on that charge, the verdict must also state
which, if any, of the specifications of aggravating circumstances were
found to exist.8' If the defendant is found guilty of the principal
charge, but innocent of any specified aggravating circumstances, he is
sentenced to life imprisonment8 2  If the defendant is found guilty of
both the principal charge of aggravated murder and at least one
aggravating circumstance, the death sentence is an available punish-
ment. Whether it will actually be imposed is to be determined by the
trial judge, if the defendant was tried by a jury, or by the three-judge
panel that tried the defendant, if he waived his right to a jury trial.33
The defendant will not suffer death if the existence of at least one of
three mitigating factors is established by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. The mitigating factors are:
(1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it;
(2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but
for the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provo-
cation;
(3) The offense was primarily the product of the offender's psy-
chosis or mental deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to es-
tablish the defense of insanity.8
(2) The offense was committed for hire.
(3) The offense was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehen-
sion, trial, or punishment for another offense committed by the offender.
(4) The offense was committed while the offender was a prisoner in a detention
facility as defined in section 2921.01 of the Revised Code.
(5) The offender has previously been convicted of an offense of ihich the gist
was the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill another, committed prior to the offense
at bar, or the offense at bar was part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful
killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons by the offender.
(6) The victim of the offense was a law enforcement officer hom the offender
knew to be such, and either the victim was engaged in his duties at the time of the
offense, or it was the offender's specific purpose to kill a law enforcement officer.
(7) The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting
to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kid-
napping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary.
77. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.17 (Page 1975).
78. Id. § 2945.05.
79. Id. § 2945.06.
80. Id. § 2929.03(B).
81. Id.
82. Id. § 2929.03(C).
83. Id.
84. Id. § 2929.04(B).
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To aid the court in making its decision on mitigation, a pre-
sentence investigation and a psychiatric examination must be made and
reports submitted.8 5 The court then "shall hear te3timony and other
evidence, the statement, if any, of the offender, and the arguments, if
any, of counsel for the defense and prosecution, relevant to the penalty
which should be imposed on the offender. 86 The court is required to
take the reports, testimony, statement of the offender, arguments of
counsel, and other evidence into consideration in determining whether
any of the mitigating circumstances has been proved by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.8 7 If no mitigating circumstance has been
so proved, the defendant must be sentenced to death 88
The Ohio Constitution provides for a right of appeal to the Ohio
Supreme Court for all cases in which the death penalty has been im-
posed. 89 The scope of that review, however, is not set forth in either
the statutes or constitution.9"
Essentially, the Ohio statutes contemplate a bifurcated trial,
one part of which is dedicated to the determination of guilt of the
principal charge and of any aggravating circumstances, and the other
part to a determination of sentence. Before a defendant can be
sentenced to death, he must be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of both the principal charge of aggravated murder and at least one
aggravating circumstance, and he must have failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence the existence of one or more mitigating
circumstances. Every defendant sentenced to death has a right of
appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court.
B. The Ohio Supreme Court's Analysis
In State v. Bayless, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the ques-
tion "whether the Ohio statutes imposing the death penalty are
constitutional in light of [Gregg, Proffitt, Jurek, Woodson, and Rob-
erts]."91  In the court's opinion, the statutes comply with the eighth
amendment standards set forth in Gregg and the cases allied with it,
and thus are constitutional. In arriving at this conclusion, the court
relied primarily on three factors: (1) the statutes provide for a bifur-
cated trial, so that guilt and sentencing are determined in separate
85. Id. § 2929.03(D).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 2929.03(E).
88. Id. If the sentencing decision is made by a panel of three judges, they must unani-
mously find that no mitigating circumstances have been proved. Id. Tais provision is discussed
in section III.C. infra.
89. OHIO CONsT. art. IV, § 2 (B)(2)(a)(ii).
90. The scope of appellate review in Ohio capital cases, and the -onstitutionality thereof,
is discussed in section II.C.2. infra.
91. 48 Ohio St. 2d 73, 79, 357 N.E.2d 1035, 1042 (1976).
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proceedings; (2) the mitigating circumstances spelled out in the statute
guide the sentencing authority in its decision whether to impose the
death sentence; and (3) every defendant sentenced to death has a
right of appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, where the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances will be independently reviewed in
light of the facts of each case.
92
The court noted: "This statutory scheme differs somewhat from
any of those considered by the United States Supreme Court in its
July 2, 1976, decisions, but it is basically similar to the Georgia,
Florida, and Texas statutes which the court found to be constitu-
tional."93  The court felt that the mitigating circumstances provided
for in the Ohio statute "are basically reasonable and similar to those
approved in Proffitt v. Florida.,94  It conceded that the Florida statute
includes more mitigating circumstances than does the Ohio statute95
and that the Georgia statute upheld in Gregg does not list specific,
exclusive mitigating circumstances,96 but refused to attach significance
to those facts. 97  Noting that the mitigating circumstances must be
"strictly construed in favor of the defendant, to allow the broadest
consideration of mitigating circumstances consistent with their lan-
guage,, 9 8 the court concluded: "We perceive no distinction of con-
92. Id. at 86, 357 N.E.2d at 1045.
93. Id. at 83, 357 N.E.2d at 1044.
94. Id. at 86, 357 N.E.2d at 1045.
95. Id. at 86, 357 N.E.2d at 1045-46. The mitigating circumstances in the Florida statute
include:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant %as under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendants conduct or consented to the
act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another
person and his participation was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination
of another person.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6) (West Supp. 1976-77). There is reason to believe that the Florida
statutes would permit consideration of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. See Proffitt '.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 250 n.8 (1976).
96. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 86, 357 N.E.2d at 1046. Georgia's statutes are described in Gre sg
Georgia as follows:
[Tihe jury is authorized to consider any other appropriate aggravating or miti-
gating circumstances. . . . The jury is not required to find any mitigating circumstance
in order to make a recommendation of mercy that is binding on the trial court. . ..
but it must find a statutory aggravating circumstance before recommending a sentence
of death.
428 U.S. at 197.
97. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 86, 357 N.E.2d at 1045-46.
98. Id., 357 N.E.2d at 1046.
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stitutional dimensions between Ohio's mitigating factors, so construed,
and those upheld in Proffitt v. Florida."99
By comparing the Ohio death penalty statutes with those re-
viewed by the United States Supreme Court in July 1976, the Ohio
Supreme Court decided that Ohio's statutes are more like the statutes
upheld in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek, than like the statutes struck down
in Woodson and Stanislaus Roberts, and thus are consistent with
eighth amendment standards. In reaching its conclusion, however,
the Ohio Supreme Court engaged in a superficial analysis that failed
to grasp or adequately respond to the weighty and difficult eighth
amendment issues presented by Ohio's death penalty scheme. Al-
though the court in later cases has attempted to revamp its initial
defense of Ohio's statutes, the court's analysis has been unconvincing
throughout. The next section of this Comment will explore the eighth
amendment issues presented by Ohio's death penalty statutes and
point out the inadequacies of the court's treatment of those issues.
C. The Issues
1. The Constitutional Adequacy of the Mitigating Circumstances
The United States Supreme Court has mandated that "in capital
cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment . .. requires consideration of the character and record of
the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular of-
fense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflict-
ing the penalty of death."' In striking down statutes that permit
no such consideration the Court eloquently stated:
A process that accords no significance to relevant factors of the character
and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particu-
lar offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punish-
ment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stem-
ming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human
beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be sub-jected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.''
Thus, it is clear that any death penalty statute, to survive judicial
scrutiny, must require the sentencing authority to impose sentence on
the basis of a particularized consideration of the characteristics of the
offense and the offender.
The question arises, then, whether the Ohio statutes authorize
99. Id. at 86-87, 357 N.E.2d at 1046 (footnote omitted).
100. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). See Harry Roberts v.
Louisiana, 97 S.Ct. 1993, 1995 (1977) (quoting this language).
101. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
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an adequate inquiry into the relevant characteristics of the crime and
of the accused prior to sentencing. 10 2  As previously noted, the Ohio
Supreme Court expressed the view that, although the Ohio General
Assembly might have included more or different mitigating circum-
stances in the Ohio death penalty statutes,10 3 its failure to do so is not
of constitutional significance. The court felt that the mitigating
circumstances "which are listed do direct inquiry both to the cir-
cumstances of the crime and to the individual culpability of the de-
fendant, and so adequately guide the decision of the sentencing
authority."'1 4  To test this assertion, it is necessary to examine each
of the three mitigating circumstances individually to determine the
scope of each.
102. For an excellent treatment of this issue, see Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil
Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc. at 4-47, State v. Carl Osborne. 50 Ohio St. 2d 211.
364 N.E.2d 216 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Amicus Curiae].
103. The early draft of the Ohio death penalty statutes passed by the Ohio House of
Representatives called for a system in which the jury or panel of three judges had the power
to recommend mercy. The sentencing authority was required to give "due consideration" to
statutory criteria in determining sentence. Those criteria-not controlling, but to be con-
sidered in favor of recommending mercy-were:
(I) The offense was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur.
(2) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it;
(3) There are circumstances tending to mitigate the offense, though failing to
establish a defense.
(4) The offender acted under strong provocation;
(5) The offender has no history of prior offenses of violence;
(6) The offender is likely to respond affirmatively to rehabilitative treatment.
Sub. H.B. No. 511, 109th Gen'l Assembly § 2929.03(C) (1971-72). These criteria uere "not to
be construed to limit the matters which may be considered in determining %%hether or not to
recommend that mercy be shown an offender for a capital offense." Id. § 2929.03(D). Compare
OHIO REv. CODE AN. § 2951.02(B)(2)-(7) (Page 1975). setting forth the considerations for
putting an offender on probation rather than imprisoning him.
The Ohio Senate adopted instead the present truncated version of the statute. Lehman
& Norris, supra note 73, indicate that the intervening Furman decision %%as responsible for
the change:
The Senate Judiciary Committee, in the midst of its consideration of Sub. H.B.
511, could not await the analyses, standards, and guidelines that would come from law
review and bar association articles and comments that follow major decisions of the
Supreme Court. At this point, working from models prepared by the staff of the Legis-
lative Service Commission, there appeared to be four basic choices under the Furman
case available to the Committee:
(I) Abolish the death penalty.
(2) Retain the death penalty, but make its imposition mandatory in specified
cases.
(3) Retain the death penalty and permit the judge or jury to decide if it is to be
imposed in a given case, but provide criteria to guide the jury or judge in
making the decision. This had been, in essence, the approach of the House of
Representatives.
(4) Refine the House position by retaining the death penalty, but remove from the
judge and jury as much discretion as possible in the punishment determining
procedure.
Mindful of the action taken by the House of Representatives in retaining capital
punishment and sensing a similar attitude by the members of the Senate, the Senate
Judiciary Committee opted for the last described alternative.
Id. at 19-20 (footnotes omitted).
104. State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St. 2d 73, 86, 357 N.E.2d 1035, 1046 (1976).
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a. "The victim of the offense induced or facilitated t The
first mitigating circumstance requires a determination whether the
"victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.""*6 The meaning of
this provision is not immediately evident. 1 7 Two possibilities come to
mind: (1) the victim of the offense "induced" it by provoking his as-
sailant (provocation); or (2) the victim "induced or facilitated" the
offense by asking to be killed (mercy killing).'0 8 Turning to the first
possibility, it must be noted that the second statutory mitigating cir-
cumstance includes "strong provocation."''0 9 It would be very unlikely
that the Ohio legislature would have included in two separate provi-
sions mitigating circumstances that are equivalent. Presumably then,
"induced or facilitated" does not refer to provocation.
The other possibility for mitigation under this provision is that the
murder was a mercy killing. On the surface, it might appear logical
and in accord with modern perceptions of just punishment that a mercy
killer not be sentenced to death. By focusing on a relevant charac-
teristic of the offense, then, this mitigating circumstance would seem
to permit the kind of individualized sentencing contemplated by the
United States Supreme Court in Gregg.
In reality, however, this mitigating circumstance has an ex-
tremely limited application. Apart from the fact that mercy killing
is not the typical homicide, this mitigating circumstance does not
come into play until after the defendant is proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of aggravated murder, and at least one aggravating
specification. The matter in mitigation must be interpreted in light of
the aggravating circumstances set forth in the statute.1'0 Mercy kill-
ing is by its nature so at odds with those aggravating circumstances-
assassination, murder for hire, murder by a prisoner, murder of a law
enforcement officer, mass murder, and so on-that it would be a rare case
105. For a discussion of the scope of this mitigating circum'stance, see Brief of Amicus
Curiae. supra note 102, at 6-10.
106. OHfo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(1) (Page 1975).
107. Indeed, one of the constitutional problems with this mitigating circumstance is that
its meaning is unclear. See text accompanying notes 161-62 infra.
108. There is a third possibility that was accepted in an unreported opinion of an Ohio
court of appeals. In the consolidated cases of State v. Hines, No. CA-634 (Ct. App. Ashland
County, Feb. 25, 1977) and State v. Lucas, No. CA-639 (Ct. App, Ashland County, Feb, 25.
1977), the victim believed the defendants were going to sell him some marijuana, when in fact
they were planning to rob him. During the robbery, the victim, who was armed, fired at the
defendants, who returned his shots, killing him. The court held that the victim of the felony
murder had induced the offense by being willing to engage in a criminal act and by being armed.
This interpretation of the first mitigating circumstance is problematic. First, the fact situ-
ation it embraces is rare. Second, the fact that the victim was armed suggests provocation.
which, in light of the phrase "strong provocation" in the second mitigating circumstance, is
presumably not included in the first mitigating circumstance. Third, to the extent that the
court focused on the bad character of the victim, it ascribed to the legislature an intent to assign
comparative values to the lives of victims.
109. OHfo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(2) (Page 1975).
110. The aggravating circumstances are listed in note 76 supra.
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in which an individual would be proved guilty of aggravated murder,
and of a specification, and still be able to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the victim of the offense "facilitated" it. While it
is possible to imagine a case in which, for example, an individual was
hired to commit a mercy killing, such a case would undoubtedly occur
very infrequently.
As further indication of the limited applicability of this provision,
it should be noted that it has not been at issue in any of the cases
decided by the Ohio Supreme Court."' Its scope, then, is really a
matter of conjecture, since the court has not yet interpreted it. If
the scope of this provision is as narrow as it appears to be, it seems
clear that consideration of this circumstance will not actually serve
to focus the attention of the sentencing authority on the characteristics
of the offense or the offender in any meaningful way in the vast number
of cases. Thus, the first mitigating circumstance, in most if not all
cases, is illusory.
b. Duress, Coercion, or Strong Provocation.112 The second
mitigating circumstance permits the sentencing authority to inquire
whether "[i]t is unlikely that the offense would have been committed,
but for the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong
provocation."" 3  In order to determine the scope of this mitigating
circumstance, it is necessary to first determine what other effect the
presence of duress, coercion, or strong provocation might have on a
defendant's criminal liability for taking the life of another. Turning
first to provocation, it must be noted that under Ohio law, homicide
liability falls into several categories: aggravated murder, composed
of premeditated murder and felony murder; 14 murder," 5 voluntary
manslaughter;" 6 and involuntary manslaughter.' 7  A killing "while
under extreme emotional stress brought on by serious provocation
reasonably sufficient" to incite the use of deadly force is voluntary
manslaughter,' not aggravated murder. Although the term "strong
provocation" is suggestive of the term "serious provocation reasonably
sufficient" to incite the use of deadly force, the two terms must not
11. The issue was raised in State v. Hines and State v. Lucas. note 108 supra. but
those cases are not being appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. See note 108 .ipra.
112. For a discussion of the scope of this mitigating circumstance, see Brief of Amicus
Curiae, supra note 102, at 23-31.
113. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(2) (Page 1975).
114. Id. § 2903.01.
115. Id. § 2903.02.
116. Id. § 2903.03.
117. Id. § 2903.04.
118. Id. § 2903.03:
(A) No person, while under extreme emotional stress brought on by serious prov-
ocation reasonably sufficient to incite him into using deadly force, shall knoingly
cause the death of another.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, a felony of
the first degree.
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be equivalent since the presence of reasonable serious provocation
will reduce a charge of aggravated murder to voluntary man-
slaughter," 9 thereby eliminating the need for mitigation. Of necessity,
then, reasonable provocation, since it acts as a reductive factor, cannot
operate also as a mitigating factor.
Presumably the term "strong provocation" is designed to en-
compass those states of emotional upset that fall short of the reductive
factor of reasonable serious provocation-states that might loosely be
referred to as "unreasonable provocation." The existence of unrea-
sonable provocation, however, may cast doubt on the defendant's
ability to premeditate. 20  If the defendant is charged with premedi-
tated murder, the prosecution must prove premeditation, a statutory
element of the crime, beyond a reasonable doubt.121 If the fact that
the defendant was provoked, even unreasonably, at the time of the
killing raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant's ability to pre-
meditate, the charge presumably would be reduced from aggravated
murder to murder. In this context, provocation could not operate as
a mitigating factor since, by virtue of a reasonable doubt of its exis-
tence, the defendant would not be convicted of aggravated murder in
the first instance.
If the defendant is charged with felony murder rather than pre-
meditated murder, however, the possible relationship between pro-
vocation and premeditation is irrelevant, since premeditation is not
an element of the crime of felony murder. 22  It is possible to argue
that, since proof of provocation would not negate the principal charge
of felony murder, provocation could operate as a mitigating circum-
stance. Again, however, this mitigating circumstance must be read in
conjunction with the aggravating circumstances. Several of the ag-
gravating specifications-assassination, murder for hire, murder to es-
cape detection or apprehension for another offense-seem so at odds
119. The Legislative Service Commission Note explaining § 2103.03. reprinted ollosving
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.03 (Page 1975), states:
[Voluntary manslaughter remains a lesser included offense of both aggravated murder
and murder. For example, in the trial of a charge of aggravatod murder. if the jury
finds that the killing was purposely done, but was not done with prior calculation or
design or under circumstances constituting felony murder, it would be bound to return a
verdict of guilty of murder. If, in addition, the jury found that the killing was done
while the offender was under extreme emotional stress brought on by sufficient and
adequate provocation, the jury would be bound to return a verdict of guilty of voluntary
manslaughter.
120. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 76 at 581 (1972),
121. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(A) (Page 1975); Patterson %. New York, 97 S. Ct, 2319
(1977); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
122. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(A) (Page 1975) (premeditated murder)
with id. § 2903.01(B) (felony murder) (both provisions set out at notw 75 supra), See Fouty v,
Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 35, 37, 186 N.E.2d 623, 625 (1962), which interpreted a similar felony
murder statute in the prior Ohio Criminal Code: "Where murder is committed ...during
the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony, deliberation and premeditated malice
is not an essential element of the crime . ..."
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with provocation as to preclude its existence once guilt of both the
charge and specification has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thus, provocation as a mitigating circumstance would appear to be
applicable in few and limited situations.
Duress and coercion 23 under Ohio law may also operate as re-
ductive factors to a charge of aggravated murder.
1 24
In the case of the most common type of aggravated murder, pur-
posely causing death in connection with certain felonies, if the defendant
has a valid defense of duress to the underlying crime, he can, at most,
be convicted of the murder, and he would not then be subject to the death
penalty.
125
123. At common law, the defense of duress was established by proof of "threatening con-
duct which produces in the defendant (1) a reasonable fear of (2) immediate (or imminent)
(3) death or serious bodily harm." W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 120. § 49 at 377 (foot-
notes omitted). Compare the formulation of the defense of duress contained in Model Penal
Code § 2.09(1).
Coercion refers to the common-law rule that a married woman was not punishable for a
crime, other than murder or treason, if she acted under the domination of her husband. If a
woman committed such a criminal act in the presence of her husband, there was a rebuttable
presumption that she was coerced by him. W. LAF,%vE & A. ScoTT. supra note 120. § 49 at
380-81. See the Ohio cases dealing with coercion listed in note 124 infra. The Model Penal
Code § 2.09(3) abolished the common-law presumption.
124. There are no Ohio cases dealing squarely with this issue. Several Ohio cases ap-
parently treat duress and coercion as defenses to crimes other than homicide: State v. Sap-
pienza, 84 Ohio St. 63, 95 N.E. 381 (1911) (duress as a defense to a charge of robbery): Tabler
v. State, 34 Ohio St. 127 (1877) (coercion as a defense to a charge of foeticide). Dats '.
State, 15 Ohio St. 72 (1846) (coercion as a defense to a charge of arson); State v. Good. 110
Ohio App. 415, 165 N.E.2d 28 (1960) (duress as a defense to a charge of illegal possession and
sale of narcotics); State v. Milam, 108 Ohio App. 254. 254, 156 N.E.2d 840 (1959) (syllabus 4)
("affirmative defense of coercion and duress to a charge of robbery"): Mayer v. State. 4 Ohio
L. Abs. 170 (Ct. App. 1925) (coercion as a defense to a charge of illegal possession of alcohol).
Miller v. State, 3 Ohio L. Abs. 107 (Ct. App. 1924) (same). Contra. Opritza %. City of
Youngstown, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 475 (Ct. App. 1928) (refusing to apply common-lan presumption
that woman committing crime in husband's presence does so under coercion, to a charge of
illegal possession of alcohol).
The Ohio Supreme Court, however, conceded in State v. Woods that duress would reduce
a charge of felony murder to murder. See note 125 i!fra and accompanying text.
125. State v. Woods, 48 Ohio St. 2d 127, 135. 357 N.E.2d 1059. 1065 (1976) (footnote
omitted), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3696 (U.S. March 21, 1977) (No. 76-1308). While
the Ohio Supreme Court was willing to concede that proof of duress or coercion would rcdue
a charge of aggravated murder, it was unwilling to state that such proof would completely
exonerate a defendant from criminal liability for homicide: "There is strong precedent for
holding that duress is not a defense to murder, but that question has not been decided in Ohio.
At common law, no person can excuse himself for taking the life of an innocent person on the
grounds of duress." Id. at 135 n.3, 357 N.E.2d at 1065 n.3.
The court's observation is somewhat of a misstatement of the common law. At common
law, duress could not excuse one for the intentional taking of another's life. "but it is a de-
fense to a killing done by another in the commission of some lesser felony partcipated in b%
the defendant under duress." W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTt, supra note 120, § 49 at 377. This situ-
ation presumably would not arise under Ohio's aggravated murder statute. ho%%ever. since felony
murder is defined as a purposeful killing. Oro Rr'. CODE A%,,. § 2903.01(B) (Page 1975).
But see State v. Lockett, 49 Ohio St. 2d 48. 358 N.E.2d 1062 (1976). cert. granted. 98 S. Ct. 261
(1977), discussed in section III.C.2. infra, holding that purpose to kill of one other than the
principal must be inferred from the aider's knowledge that the principal was using a deadly
weapon in the commission of the felony.
A contrary result was reached in State v. Milam. 108 Ohio App. 254. 156 N.E.2d 840
(1959), involving a charge of first degree murder against an aider and abettor for "the killing
of a person while in the perpetration of a robbery'." Id. at 255. 156 N.E.2d at 840. '[Aln af-
firmative defense of coercion and duress to the robbery appears made out and the defendant's
19771
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If duress or coercion will reduce a charge of felony murder to murder,
it would seem that either might also reduce a charge of premeditated
murder to murder, inasmuch as proof of duress or coercion might
negate the element of premeditation.
1 26
In order for duress or coercion to operate as mitigating circum-
stances, then, their scope must be broader than when they operate as
reductive factors.1
2 7
This is particularly true since the defendant is required to establish
duress or coercion by a preponderance of the evidence for purposes of
mitigation, whereas during trial he is required only to present evidence
sufficient to raise such an affirmative defense, and the burden of disproving
it beyond a reasonable doubt remains with the prosecution.
2 8
In State v. Woods, the Ohio Supreme Court attempted to give these
terms the broadest possible meaning by defining them with regard to
their meanings in civil actions as well as their ordinary dictionary
meanings.1 9  The court construed the mitigating circumstances of
duress and coercion as follows:
The essential characteristic of coercion which emerges from these
participation in the robbery excused, and a judgment of first degice murder for the killing ol
such arresting police officer which results when defendant's comp3nions attempt to escape is
contrary to the evidence and will be reversed." Id. at 254 (syllabus 4). The court, however,
ordered that the defendant be retried on the murder charge, with the jury to consider "whether
the robbery was still continuing or ended when the homicide occurred." Id, at 268-69, 156
N.E.2d at 848.
126. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 120, § 49 at 379. At any rate. as the court
noted, premeditated murder is not the most common type of aggravated murder, and pre-
meditated murder coupled with duress would undoubtedly occur infrequently. Witness the
fact that there are no Ohio cases dealing with this issue. Note 124 supra Thus, even if
duress is not a defense to premeditated murder, and therefore could operate as a mitigating
circumstance, it would come into play very infrequently.
127. State v. Woods. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 135, 357 N.E.2d at 1065: "Accordingly, to have
any effective meaning, the terms 'duress' and 'coercion' in R. C. 2929.04 (B) must be construed,
if possible, more broadly than when used as a defense in criminal cases,"
128. Id. The first part of this quotation was purportedly ovetruled in State v. Downs. 51
Ohio St. 2d 47, 364 N.E.2d 1140 (1977) (syllabus i). In Downs, he Supreme Court of Ohio
held that the mitigation hearing in a capital case is not adversary in nature and therelore tile
trial court is required to consider evidence in mitigation of punishment regardless of whether
the defendant offers any such evidence himself. The court felt thi!, observation required over-
ruling the language quoted from Woods. But the Downs case makes clear that mitigation
must be proved by a preponderance and "that if the evidence is in equilibrium, the risk
of non-persuasion falls upon the defendant." Id. at 55, 364 N.E.2d at 1146, Since nothing in
the language quoted in the text conflicts with Downs, it is difficult to understand why the court
felt that it should be overruled. Presumably, the court merely wanted to indicate that the
defendant does not bear the burden of initially producing mitigating evidence, an observation
that in no way impairs the validity of the quotation for the purposes of indicating the relation-
ship between proving mitigating duress and proving the defense of duress.
For its discussion of the burden of proving duress as an affirmative defense during the
trial, the court in Woods cited as authority State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 NJ,2d
88 (1976), which held that, under Ohio Revised Code § 2901.05, the defendant has only tile
burden of going forward with sufficient evidence to raise the issue of self-defense and does not
bear the burden of proof on that issue. Previously. the defendant bore the burden of proving
duress by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Sappienza. 84 Ohio St. 63, 95 NE. 381
(1911).
129. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 135-36, 357 N.E.2d at 1065-66.
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definitions is that force, threat of force, strong persuasion or domination
by another, necessitous circumstances, or some combination of those,
has overcome the mind or volition of the defendant so that he acted other
than he ordinarily would have acted in the absence of those influences. 30
While this definition may seem generous and to focus upon the
particular characteristics of the accused, it has not been liberally ap-
plied by the court. Although asserting that "the purpose of mitigation
is to recognize that the punishment assigned for a criminal act may,
for ethical and humanitarian reasons, be tempered out of consideration
of the individual offender and his crime," 31 in the three cases in which
the issue of duress or coercion was raised, the court virtually deemed
evidence of the defendant's susceptibility to influence or domination
irrelevant. For example, in State v. Woods, 32 the defendant Woods
and his companion Reaves participated in an attempted robbery that
culminated in the death of a police officer. The court conceded that
the evidence establishes a consistent portrait of Woods as a young man
with no previous criminal record but one who was easily led and who
came under the influence of Reaves, the brother of the woman he was
living with. It appears likely that it was the influence of Reaves which
persuaded Woods to agree to participate in a robbery, to acquiesce and
cooperate in the purchase of the gun, and to remain at the scene of the
attempted robbery despite his reluctance.
133
The psychiatrist who examined Woods "testified further that Woods
was a person 'dependent on other people's opinions and leadership,'
that he 'would not offer much objection to being dominated or con-
trolled,' and that he probably would not have committed the crime if
he had not been under duress, coercion, or strong provocation.' 34
Yet, this evidence did not, in the court's opinion, make it more likely
than not that Woods was acting under "strong persuasion or domina-
tion by another," or "other than he ordinarily would have acted." For,
the court explained:
Flihe hard fact remains that when the opportunity to abandon the rob-
bery, to surrender to the police, to flee, or even to refrain from firing,
was presented, Woods nevertheless opened fire on the wounded officer,
despite the fact that Woods was not ordered or even urged to do so. In
committing that act, for which punishment under law must now be set,
130. Id. at 137, 357 N.E.2d at 1066. Although the quotation refers specifically only to
coercion," it is apparent from the context that the definition is intended as a composite one
that encompasses both "duress" and "coercion." It should be noted that the definition shades
over into the defense of necessity as well.
131. Id. at 137, 357 N.E.2d at 1066.
132, 48 Ohio St. 2d 127, 357 N.E.2d 1059 (1976), petition for cert.,filed. 45 U.S.L.W. 3696
(U.S. March 21, 1977) (No. 76-1308).
133. Id. at 137-38, 357 N.E.2d at 1066.
134. Id. at 134, 357 N.E.2d at 1064.
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defendant Woods was under neither coercion nor duress, and we can
accordingly find no grounds for reducing the sentence of death imposedupon him. 35
Similarly, in State v. Bell,3 6 the court reiterated the breadth of
these mitigating circumstances, intimating that the age and prior crimi-
nal record of the defendant could be taken into consideration in de-
termining the existence of duress or coercion.13' Again, however,
the court gave these circumstances little or no weight in actually decid-
ing whether mitigation had been proved. The defendant Bell was six-
teen years old at the time of the offense. "There was evidence in the
psychiatric reports that [Bell] was perhaps easily led by Hall [Bell's
adult companion in the murder]."' 38  The court even conceded that
"rw]hen combined with appellant's age, it is conceivable that all
characteristics could establish the mitigating circumstance defined by
R. C. 2929.04(B)(2)."" 9 Yet, the court found these facts insufficient
to establish the mitigating circumstance by a preponderance of the
evidence. The court said:
However, we believe the panel was justified and correct in finding that
this mitigating circumstance was not established by the evidence. Even
if it were believed that [Bell] was apprehensive of Hall and was "forced"
to go along with the crimes, the hard fact remains that [Bell] could have
135. Id. at 138, 357 N.E.2d at 1066.
According to Woods' testimony, Reaves bragged of his criminal past and owned a
sawed-off shotgun with "initials" cut in the stock for men he had killed. Woods did not
claim that he was actually threatened by Reaves, but did assert t iat he was intimidated
by him, wished to back out of the planned robbery, and went abng with it unwillingly
only after Reaves placed the gun in his hands and told him that all he had to do w&as
stay on the sidewalk and watch for the police, Woods testified that he was reluctant
to stay, but that he was afraid of what Reaves might do because of his violent reputa-
tion, and that when they were walking away he was only going to talk to the police-
man, but that Reaves pushed Woods back and started shooting Woods said that he
had shot at the policeman because he was scared.
Id. at 133-34, 357 N.E.2d at 1064.
In both Woods and State v. Bell, 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 358 N.E.2-I 556 (1976), cert. granted
97 S. Ct. 2971 (1977), discussed in the text accompanying notes 136-40 infra, the court seemed
to be importing into the mitigating circumstance of duress an element included in the defense
of duress-that the defendant take advantage of a reasonable opportunity to escape. 4 Ohio
Jury Instructions § 411.20(a) (Provisional Criminal 1974) ("When a person is forced to
participate in a crime against his will because he honestly believe, and has good reason to
believe that he is in immediate danger of death or great bodily harm, and that there was no
reasonable opportunity to escape, he is entitled to be acquitted on the ground of duress,").
W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 120, § 49 at 378 (footnote omitted) ("One threatened with
immediate death or serious bodily injury may lose his defense of duress if he does not take
advantage of a reasonable opportunity to escape, where that can ;e done without exposing
himself unduly to death or serious bodily injury.").
136. 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 358 N.E.2d 556 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 2971 (1977).
137. Id. at 281, 358 N.E.2d at 564.
138. Id. at 282, 358 N.E.2d at 564. Hall and Bell accosted the victim with a shotgun and
forced him into the trunk of his automobile, which they then stole. Hall drove the victim's
automobile, Bell drove the automobile in which Hall and Bell were riding prior to the crime,
The victim was later taken to a cemetery and shot. It is unclear which of the two actually
killed the victim. Id. at 271-72, 358 N.E.2d at 559.
139. Id.
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very easily quit the scheme while following in another car. Further, it
must be remembered that [Bell] and Hall were engaged in the same type
of scheme the very next day when Hall was arrested. We agree with the
panel that, after considering all relevant factors, the second mitigating
circumstance was not established.
1 40
The court never explained in either case how a defendant who is
acting under the domination or influence of another could be ex-
pected to suddenly escape that domination to avoid committing the
murder.
Most recently in State v. Weind,14t the Ohio Supreme Court re-
jected the defendant's contention that mitigating duress had been
proved. The court summarized the evidence in mitigation as follows:
In the instant cause, while the doctors agreed that the defendant's
involvement in the crime was highly unusual, given his behavioral his-
tory, there was no evidence adduced at trial, during the psychiatrists'
interviews, or at the mitigation hearing, of any force or threat of force
that could have motivated the defendant to commit the crime. Nor was
there any evidence to indicate that the defendant acted out of necessity.
The only evidence to indicate that a mitigating force affected the acts of
the defendant was that he was easily led because he felt a need to be-
long, and that he was non-violent in nature.42
The court held this evidence insufficient to establish mitigation:
Although this evidence suggests that the defendant may have acted
under a strong domination or persuasion, it is outweighed by other evi-
dence, such as his relationship to his co-conspirators, his motive for
committing the crime, and his participation in the planning and cover-up
of the crime, which suggests his acts were voluntary.43
If the court meant that in order to prove the mitigating circum-
stance of duress, the defendant must negate the voluntariness of his
act, then the court effectively made this mitigating circumstance
illusory. Proof of the voluntariness of the defendant's act is "an
absolute requirement for criminal liability,' 4 4 and thus must be es-
tablished in order to convict the defendant in the first instance. At
any rate, Weind is further illustration that the court's broad definition
of duress has been narrowed considerably by application. Proof that
Weind acted under "strong domination or persuasion"-purportedly
140. Id. at 282, 358 N.E.2d at 564-65.
141. 50 Ohio St. 2d 224, 364 N.E.2d 224 (1977).
142. Id. at 231, 364 N.E. 2d at 230.
143. Id.
144. W. LAFAVE & A. Scott, supra note 120, § 25 at 181. See Robinson v. California.
370 U.S. 660 (1962). Additionally, OHio Ray. CODE ANN. § 2901.21 (Page 1975) provides in
relevant part
(A) ... a person is not guilty of an offense unless both of the following apply.
(1) His liability is based on conduct which includes either a voluntary act or an
omission to perform an act or duty which he is capable of performing;
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sufficient to prove mitigation by the court's own definition-was insuffi-
cient to mitigate Weind's punishment. It would seem that a de-
fendant, in order to prove mitigating duress, apparently must either
meet the requirements of the defense of duress-which has already been
proved not to exist beyond a reasonable doubt by virtue of the con-
viction of aggravated murder145 -or must meet a higher standard of
proof than by a preponderance of the evidence--which, of course,
violates the statute.
Thus, because of the narrowness of the factor "strong provocation"
and the narrow application of the factors "duress" and "coercion,"
these factors authorize an extremely narrow inquiry into the charac-
teristics of the criminal and his crime. As a result, few, if any,
defendants will be able to rely on them to establish mitigation.
c. Psychosis or Mental Deficiency.146  The third mitigating cir-
cumstance authorizes the sentencing authority to inquire whether
"the offense was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or
mental deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the
defense of insanity." 147  As the provision indicates, Ohio law also
provides for a defense of insanity which, when established, absolves
the defendant from criminal liability for his act. 148 The legal defense
of insanity was defined by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v.
Staten:'
49
One accused of criminal conduct is not responsible for such criminal
conduct if, at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or
defect, he does not have the capacity either to know the wrongfulness
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law. 150
In order for the third mitigating circumstance to have any substantive
effect, it must be more broadly defined than the Staten definition of
the legal defense of insanity. This is especially true in light of the Ohio
Supreme Court's recent holding that insanity is an affirmative defense
145. See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
146. For a discussion of the third mitigating circumstance, see Brief of Amicus Curiae,
supra note 102, at 11-23.
147. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(3) (Page 1975). This provision apparently is a
variation on the ill-fated Durham test for insanity. That test, set forth in Durham v. United
States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), is as follows: "[A]n accused is rot criminally responsible
if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect." Id. at 874-75.
148. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2943.03(E) (plea of not guilty by reason of insanity)
and 2945.37-.40 (procedure for inquiry into sanity of defendant and effect of verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity) (Page 1975).
149. 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 247 N.E.2d 293 (1969).
150. Id. at 13, 247 N.E.2d at 294 (syllabus 1). This definition is a combination of the
M'Naghten "right from wrong" test and the "irresistible impulse" test for legal insanity. See
generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scotr, supra note 120, § 37 at 274-86.
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that under Ohio's burden of proof statute 5' the defendant must raise,
but the prosecution must negate beyond a reasonable doubt.1
52
The Ohio Supreme Court's first attempt at defining the third
mitigating circumstance produced this formulation in State v. Bayless:
Mental deficiency is consistently defined to mean a low or defective
state of intelligence. Construing the term broadly, a deficiency may be
severe or mild, and may be hereditary or caused by brain defect, disease,
or injury, or by whatever other condition might cause subnormal in-
telligence. But it does not include the emotional and behavioral ab-
normalities claimed to exist by the defense.1
53
This definition would nearly collapse the mitigating circumstance of
mental deficiency or psychosis into the defense of insanity-which has
already been proved not to exist beyond a reasonable doubt by virtue
of the conviction for aggravated murder. 54  The mental conditions
"psychosis" and "mental deficiency," as defined by the court in
Bayless, would appear to be included in the mental conditions con-
sidered in the legal defense of insanity, as articulated in Staten."'
151. OHIo RE v. CODE ANN. § 2901.05 (Page 1975).
152. State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977), interpreting OIo
REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(A) (Page 1975). Prior to the enactment of the new criminal code in
Ohio, the defendant was required to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.
State v. Jackson, 32 Ohio St. 2d 203, 291 N.E.2d 432 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 909 (1973);
State v. Johnson, 31 Ohio St. 2d 106, 285 N.E.2d 751 (1972); State v. Staten, 18 Ohio St. 2d 13,
247 N.E.2d 293 (1969).
153. 48 Ohio St. 2d 73, 96, 357 N.E.2d 1035, 1050-51 (1976).
154. It seems highly unlikely that any defendant would not take advantage of the defense
of insanity when available to him in a trial for aggravated murder. The failure of counsel to
enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity when a basis exists for such a plea has been
held to be a denial of effective assistance of counsel, requiring a reversal of the conviction.
Schaber v. Maxwell, 348 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1965).
155. The Staten definition of legal insanity requires a "mental disease or defect."
These mental conditions would appear to be quite broadly defined. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr.
supra note 120, § 37 at 275, 276 (footnotes omitted), referring to the M'Naghten test for in-
sanity:
There has never been a clear and comprehensive determination of what type of mental
disease or defect is required to satisfy the M'Naghten test. Some believe that only a
few types of psychoses will suffice. However, it would seem that any mental ab-
normality, be it psychosis, neurosis, organic brain disorder, or congenital intellectual
deficiency (low IQ or feeblemindedness), will suffice if it has caused the consequences
described in the second part of the test.
When a jury is instructed on the M'Naghten test, the usual practice is merely to
recite the "disease of the mind" element to the jury. No effort is made to define or ex-
plain what qualifies as a mental disease.
See also McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962), giving this definition
of mental disease or defect for the purposes of the Durham test for insanity: "[Tihe jury
should be told that a mental disease or defect includes any abnormal condition of the mind
which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior
controls."
4 OHIo JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 411.51(C) (Provisional Criminal 1974), does not attempt to
define mental disease or defect:
In order to establish the defense of insanity, the accused must establish by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence [This part of the instruction has since been overruled in
State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977).] that a disease or other
defect of his mind had so impaired his reason that, at the time of the criminal act
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The only possible difference between the two forrmulations is that the
mitigating factor requires only that the offense must be "primarily
the product of" the offender's mental defect or disease, whereas the
defense of insanity requires that the offender "not have the capacity"
to conform his conduct to the law's requirements or to know the
wrongfLlness of his conduct because of his mental defect or disease.
Thus, it must be determined whether there is any significant difference
between these two formulations.
Although Ohio's definition of legal insanity apparently requires
that the offender have no capacity to know the wrongfulness of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, it
has been argued that it is virtually impossible to ever say that an
individual, no matter how mentally ill or deficient, lacks all capacity
to know the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his behavior
to the law. 156  To the extent that Ohio's defense of insanity can be
considered to require less than total incapacity to know the wrongful-
ness of one's conduct or to conform one's acts to the requirements of
the law,'57 the scope of the third mitigating circumstance is narrowed,
with which he is charged, either he did not know that such act was wrong or he did
not have the ability to refrain from doing that act.
Mitigation. on the other hand, requires a "psychosis" or "mental deficiency." A
psychosis would presumably qualify as a mental disease, and the definition of "mental
deficiency" in Bayless was limited to low intelligence caused by brain damage, defect, or
disease.
156. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The Model Penal
Code formulation of the defense of insanity is contained in § 4.01(I) (Proposed Official Draft
1962): "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the :ime of such conduct aq a
result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law." (Emphasis added). The Comment to § 4.01(l) of Tentative Draft Number 4 of the
Model Penal Code, which is substantially identical to the provision quoted above, states:
The law must recognize that when there is no black and white it must content itself
with different shades of gray. The draft, accordingly, does not demand complete impair-
ment of capacity. It asks instead for substantial impairment. That is all, we think.
that candid witnesses, called on to infer the nature of the situation at a time they did
not observe, can ever confidently say, even when they know that a disorder was ex-
treme.
W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 120, § 38 at 293 says of the Model Penal Code formu-
lation:
Most significant is the fact that the A.L.I. test only requires a lack of "substantial
capacity." This is clearly a departure from the usual interpretation of M'Naghtcn
and irresistible impulse, whereby a complete impairment of cognitive capacity and
capacity for self-control is necessary. Substantial capacity, th- draftsmen noted, is
all "that candid witnesses [. .] can ever confidently say [. ... " Moreover, even if
witnesses could be more specific, it is undoubtedly true that there are many cases of
advanced mental disorder in which rudimentary capacities of cognition and volition
exist but which clearly present inappropriate occasions for the 1pplication of criminal
sanctions. [footnotes omitted].
See Allen, The Rule of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, 45 MARQ, L, Rtv.
494, 501 (1962).
157. Note, The Proposed Affirmative Defenses of Forced Perpetration, Entrapment, In-
toxication and Insanity, 33 OHIo ST. L.J. 397, 417 (1972) (The Staten test "reflects much
similarity with the Model Penal Code's formulation."); Onto LrGISLATIVE SERVIcr CoM-
MISSION, PROPOSED OHIO CRIMINAL CODE 59 (1971) ("An analysis of the Staten rule reveals
that, substantively, it is equivalent to the American Law Institute's insanity defense .. . .")
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since it would seem that if there were not even a reasonable doubt that
the defendant lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to
the requirements of the law or to know the wrongfulness of his acts,
then the defendant could not prove by a preponderance that the of-
fense was "primarily the product of" a psychosis or mental deficiency.
Another factor narrows the third mitigating circumstance still
more. That factor, which the Supreme Court of Ohio has never con-
fronted, is that the presence of a mental disease or defect can also
operate as a reductive factor in a trial for aggravated murder if it
raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant's purpose to kill or
premeditation.158 In a trial for aggravated murder when the de-
fendant's mental condition is in issue, the jury must find against the
defendant on his defense of legal insanity and have no reasonable
doubt that the defendant's mental condition prevented him from
forming the requisite criminal intent before the mitigating circum-
stances ever come into play. Thus, even if there is a difference be-
tween the Staten test for legal insanity and the third mitigating cir-
cumstance, that difference would appear to be virtually consumed by
the scope of mental condition as a reductive factor. At best, the
mitigating effect of mental condition is squeezed after the exculpating
effect of insanity and the reductive effect of diminished capacity.
The Ohio Supreme Court apparently perceived the difficulties
raised by the Bayless definition of the third mitigating circumstance,
for in a later case it broadened its original approach. In State v.
Black,159 the court interpreted this mitigating provision more liber-
ally:
It is clear that the General Assembly chose the [terms "psychosis"
and "mental deficiency"] to allow the trial judge or panel the broadest
possible latitude in the examination of the defendant's mental state and
mental capacity for the purpose of the mitigation inquiry, excepting only
legal insanity, the existence of which would have absolved the defendant
from criminal responsibility for his crime. Thus, incapacity may be
considered in light of all the circumstances and including the nature of
the crime itself so that it may be determined whether the condition found
to have existed was the primary producing cause of the offense. To de-
fine terms such as those used in the statute is to narrow them.10
In the course of broadening the definition of the third mitigating
factor, the Ohio Supreme Court may well have created another consti-
The Ohio Supreme Court, however, apparently rejected the Model Penal Code formula-
tion of the insanity defense in State v. Staten. It apparently felt that the Staten rule requires
more than a substantial incapacity. 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 18, 247 N.E.2d 293. 297 (1969). But. as
noted elsewhere, the differences between the two formulations-if any-are slight.
158. State v. Nichols, 3 Ohio App. 2d 182, 209 N.E.2d 750 (1965): 4 011o JURv l'mtc-
TIONS § 409.77 (Provisional Criminal 1974). See generally W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note
120, § 42 at 325-32. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(1) (1962).
159. 48 Ohio St. 2d 262, 358 N.E.2d 551 (1976).
160. Id. at 268, 358 N.E.2d at 555-56.
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tutional problem. No matter how broad or narrow the mitigating cir-
cumstances may be, they must adequately focus and channel the sen-
tencing authority's discretion in order to avoid the arbitrary sentenc-
ing condemned in Furman. In Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court
of the United States declared that while the existence of statutory
standards is generally sufficient to eliminate this problem, such stan-
dards will not "inevitably satisfy the concerns of Furman:''16' "A sys-
tem could have standards so vague that they would fail adequately to
channel the sentencing decision patterns of juries with the result that
a pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing like that found uncon-
stitutional in Furman could occur.
1 62
Thus, it is not enough that Ohio's statute contain mitigating cir-
cumstances. In addition, these circumstances must be sufficiently clear
and certain to insure that sentencing authorities are using the same
standards to determine sentence in all capital cases. The Supreme
Court of Ohio, by refusing to define the third mitigating circumstance,
has scarcely provided guidance to Ohio judges for setting sentences.
To add to the confusion, the court in Black never even alluded to
the Bayless definition, let alone overrule it. Nor did the court order
new sentencing hearings for Bayless and other defendants sentenced
under the older and presumably stricter standard.
Assuming it is not unconstitutionally vague, the Black formula-
tion would seem to permit a consideration of a broad spectrum of men-
tal conditions for the purposes of mitigation. In practice, however,
the formulation has not been so applied. In fact, the Ohio Supreme
Court has yet to reverse a death sentence because it felt that the re-
quirements of the third mitigating circumstance had been met. In
seven cases, 163 the court rejected the defendant's contention that miti-
gation under this provision had been proved. In State v. Ba less,
for example, the evidence showed that Bayless was "of about normal
or dull normal mental development," "emotionally and culturally de-
prived," and "sub-normal in emotional control or conscience," 16 4 yet
he received no benefit of the third mitigating circumstance. The de-
fendant in State v. Bell was sixteen years old, had an "unsatisfactory
home," lacked "family or other supervision," was involved with drugs,
and unable "to cope with school demands.' ' 65  Mitigation was not
161. 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (footnote omitted).
162. Id. at 195 n.46.
163. State v. Weind, 50 Ohio St. 2d 224, 364 N.E.2d 224 (1977); State v. Sandra Lockett,
49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 358 N.E.2d 1062 (1976), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 261 (1977); State v. Edwards,
49 Ohio St. 2d 31, 358 N.E.2d 1051 (1976); State v. Harris, 48 Ohio St. 2d 351, 359 N.E.2d 67
(1976); State v. Bell, 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 358 N.E.2d 556 (1976), cert. granted, 7 S. Ct. 2971
(1977); State v. Black, 48 Ohio St. 2d 262, 358 N.E.2d 551 (1976); State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St.
2d 73, 357 N.E.2d 1035 (1976).
164. 48 Ohio St. 2d 73, 94, 357 N.E.2d 1035, 1049-50 (1976).
165. 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 282, 358 N.E.2d 556, 565 (1976).
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found. Indeed the court rejected the defendant's contention "that a
minor defendant is per se 'mentally deficient'."' 66  Likewise in State v.
Harris, evidence showing that the defendant, seventeen years old, was
a sociopath was unavailing since the court did "not equate 'sociopath'
as being [sic] either a psychosis or mental deficiency."
67
Thus, the third mitigating circumstance has been defined broadly,
but applied narrowly. 68  Defendants such as Bayless or Bell, whose
mental conditions would appear to be encompassed by the Black def-
inition of the third mitigating circumstance, are unable to obtain
mitigation under it. The possibility of mitigation under the third
mitigating circumstance is further reduced by the fact that mitigation
must be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.
The mitigating potential of the third circumstance is also narrowed
by the fact that the defendant's mental condition, by negating pre-
meditation or purpose to kill, may reduce a charge of aggravated
murder, thereby obviating the need for mitigation. The scope of the
third mitigating circumstance is, of necessity, by definition and appli-
cation, quite narrow, if indeed perceptible at all.
Thus, the three mitigating circumstances spelled out in the Ohio
statutes are quite narrow in scope, and have been applied quite nar-
rowly.169  The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the sentencing
authority is statutorily authorized to consider only the three mitigat-
ing circumstances spelled out in the statute.170  Other factors, such as
166. Id.
167. 48 Ohio St. 2d 351, 362, 359 N.E.2d 67, 73 (1976). Sociopathy is not ala~s con-
sidered a mental disease or defect within the meaning of the insanity defense. W. LkF%%E
& A. ScoTr, supra note 120, § 37 at 275-76; MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962).
168. For a broader application of the mitigating effect of the defendants mental condition
in capital cases, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962):
Whenever the jury or the Court is authorized to determine or to recommend
whether or not the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment upon
conviction, evidence that the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law %as
impaired as a result of mental disease or defect shall be admissible in favor of sentence
of imprisonment.
and State v. Staten, 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 20, 247 N.E.2d 293, 298 (1969):
However, if an accused knows that his criminal act is wrong and has the ability to
refrain from that act, we see no reason for not punishing him for doing that act. even
where his capacity for knowing the wrongfulness of that act or his capacity to refrain
therefrom has been diminished. Such diminished capacity may represent a reason for
a diminished punishment but not for an absence of any punishment.
169. The Ohio Supreme Court has yet to find mitigation in any case it has rcsied in
which the death penalty was imposed. See note 189 infra and accompanying text.
Contrast the mitigating circumstances spelled out in the following statutes: ALA. CODE
tit. 15, §§ 342(5), (9) (Interim Supp. 1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1304 (Ark. Crim. Code 1975):
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a (West 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6) (West Cum. Supp.
1975-76) (set forth at note 95 supra); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3102. 27-2534.1 (1976).
170. OHio R .CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (Page 1975):
[Tihe death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded when, considering the nature
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the age or criminal record of the defendant are, in and of themselves,
irrelevant to the sentencing decision. Although the Ohio Supreme
Court has attempted to erode the exclusiveness of the three mitigat-
ing circumstances by saying that other factors may be considered.''
it is clear that they are considered only insofar as they are relevant
to the three statutory mitigating factors. 72  Under Ohio law, while the
and circumstances of the offense and the history, character, and condition of the of-
fender, one or more of the following is established by a preponderance of the evidence;
(1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
(2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact
that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation.
(3) The offense was primarily the product of the offender'; psychosis or mental
deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the defense of insanity.
[emphasis added].
Some Ohio cases, however, have held that the mitigating circumstances listed in the statute
are not exclusive, e.g., State v. Farmer, 73 Ohio Op. 2d 341 (C.P. Montgomery County 1975).
The court in Farmer held that § 2929.04(B) is in pari materia with another statutory provision
relating to mitigation of penalty, Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.06 (Page 1975). which does not
limit the scope of the sentencing authority's inquiry for purposes of mitigation, The court
stated:
R. C. §§ 2947.06 and 2929.04, being in pari materia (the latter not having been re-
pealed) the mitigating circumstances set forth in (B)(3) [sic] of R, C. § 2929.04, are ac-
cumulative and the Court is not bound to R. C. § 2929.04(B)(1) (2) and (3). exclusively
without being able to consider other matters ....
73 Ohio Op. 2d at 343.
Section 2947.06, however, cannot properly be read in pari wateria with § 2929.04(B),
for the former section authorizes the court to "determine whether sentence ought immediately
to be imposed or the defendant placed on probation." (emphasis addcd). On the other hand.
the latter section authorizes the court to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced
to death or to life imprisonment. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.02(A) (Page 1975), Given
the differences in the nature of these inquiries, it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand
how § 2947.06 could apply to the sentencing decision in a capital case.
171. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 281, 358 N.E.2d 556. 564 (1976), cert,
granted, 97 S. Ct. 2971 (1977):
It has been alleged that the mitigating circumstances under R. C. 2929.04 (B) are
unconstitutionally narrow because a number of very important ft ctors, such as the age
and criminal record of the defendant, appear to be irrelevant under the statute, We
believe, however, that the Ohio statutory scheme can withstand this attack, The Ohio
statutes, properly construed, permit the trial judge or panel to consider these factors
at the mitigation hearing. Such a statutory construction is evident as R. C. 2929.04
(B) states that "the death penalty . . . is precluded when, considering the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history, character, and condition of the offender"
(emphasis added), one or more of the mitigating circumstances is established. This
conclusion is buttressed by the requirement that these statutory provisions be liber-
ally construed in favor of the accused.
The court in Bell, however, looked only to the three mitigating factors in the statute, making
it clear that age and lack of a criminal record are not independent mitigating factors, Id.
This response certainly does not meet the argument that was riade, since the contention
is that other factors, such ap age, should not be merely relevant to, bit sufficient for mitigation.
Moreover, it is difficult to understand how the defendant's age or criminal record could be rele-
vant to whether the "victim of the offense induced or facilitated it." It is also difficult to understand
how the defendant's criminal record could be relevant to whether he acted under duress or
provocation, or to whether he had a mental disease or defect which was the primary cause of
his criminal act.
172. State v. Alberta Osborne, 49 Ohio St. 2d 135, 146.47, 359 N.E.2d 78, 86 (1976):
In State v. Bell . . . we held that the mitigating circumstances of R. C. 2929.04 (B)
were not to be construed narrowly and that relevant factors, ,.uch as prior criminal
record and age of defendant, were to be considered by the sentencing authority.
Thus, in considering whether the crime was primarily the product of a mental
deficiency under R. C. 2929.04 (B)(3), the trier of fact at the penalty proceedings may
consider any mental deficiency or incapacity in light of all the circumstances including
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sentencing authority may consider the fact that the defendant is six-
teen years old in determining whether or not he is mentally deficient,1
it cannot grant him mercy simply because he is sixteen years old,
and, in the opinion of the sentencing authority, "too young to die." 174
It is important to notice the kinds of factors deemed irrelevant to
the sentencing decision by Ohio's death penalty statutes. Factors
such as the absence of any previous criminal offense, or the youth of
the defendant-factors which would seem to bring to bear in capital
cases generally shared views on culpability and punishment-are
given no independent weight in the sentencing decision. The Supreme
Court of the United States has given some indication of the types of
mitigating circumstances it has in mind when it speaks of mitigation in
capital cases. In Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, the Court, in striking
down a mandatory death penalty scheme, made the following observa-
tion:
Circumstances such as the youth of the offender, the absence of any
prior conviction, the influence of drugs, alcohol or extreme emotional
disturbance, and even the existence of circumstances which the of-
fender reasonably believed provided a moral justification for his con-
duct are all examples of mitigating facts which might attend the killing
of a peace officer and which are considered relevant in other jurisdic-
tions.
As we emphasized repeatedly in Roberts and its companion cases
decided last Term, it is essential that the capital sentencing decision
allow for consideration of whatever mitigating circumstances may be
relevant to either the particular offender or the particular offense.' 7"
Neither the Georgia nor Florida statutes restrict the inquiry into
mitigating circumstances so narrowly as does the Ohio statute. In-
deed, the Florida statute-to which the Ohio Supreme Court felt the
Ohio statute is similar-contains a number of mitigating circumstances,
including the defendant's age and criminal record, not contained in
the Ohio statute. 176 The Model Penal Code also recognizes factors not
recognized in Ohio as mitigating in capital cases.
77
the nature of the crime .... Similarly, in R. C. 2929.04 (BX2). the terms "duress"
and "coercion" are to be construed more broadly than when used as a defense in crim-
inal cases. . . . These constructions appropriately allow consideration of a broad range
of information relevant to mitigation set out in R. C. 2929.04.
173. State v. Bell, 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 282, 358 N.E.2d 556, 565 (1976), cert. granted. 97
S. Ct. 2971 (1977): "W]e do hold that a defendant's age is a primary factor in determining the
existence of a mental deficiency."
174. The Ohio Supreme Court was also unwilling to say that a minor defendant is per se
mentally deficient. Id. at 280, 358 N.E.2d at 563.
175. 97 S. CL at 1996 (footnotes omitted).
176. See note 95 supra.
177. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962):
(4) Mitigating Circumstances.
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
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It may be argued, however, that the Texas statute was upheld by
the United States Supreme Court in Jurek v. Texas although it does
not accord independent significance to various factors in the sentenc-
ing decision. The Texas statute provides that the death penalty
cannot be imposed unless the jury unanimously finds beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the answer to each of three questions is ves."
The second of the three questions to be answered is "whether there
is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society."7 As
the United States Supreme Court viewed the Texas death penalty
scheme, the inquiry required by the second question is sufficient "to
allow a defendant to bring to the jury's attention whatever mitigating
circumstances he may be able to show."' 80 The Court noted the broad
interpretation given the question by the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals:
In determining the likelihood that the defendant would be a continu-
ing threat to society, the jury could consider whether the defendant had
a significant criminal record. It could consider the range and severity of
his prior criminal conduct. It could look further to the age of the defen-
dant and whether or not at the time of the commission of the offense he
was acting under duress or under the domination of another. It could
also consider whether the defendant was under an extreme form of men-
tal or emotional pressure .... 18
Thus, one can say that age and other factors are relevant under
the Texas statute only insofar as they tend to negate the probability
that the defendant will engage in further criminal acts that constitute
a threat to society. Nevertheless, the inquiry conducted by the jury in
answering the second question appears to be considerably broader
than the inquiry permitted by the three mitigating circumstances in
the Ohio statute. Whether a defendant will engage in criminal acts
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's hom cidal conduct or con-
sented to the homicidal act.
(d) The murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant be-
lieved to provide a moral justification or extenuation fot his conduct.
(e) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person
and his participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.
(f) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another per-
son.
(g) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or
intoxication.
(h) The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime.
178. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071 (c), (e) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77),
179. Id. art. 37.071 (b).
180. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 272 (1976).
181. Id. at 272 (quoting Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934, 939-40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)).
The United States Supreme Court also noted that the other two stLtutory questions to be an-
swered by the jury could be construed to include consideration of other mitigating circum-
stances. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 272 n.7.
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in the future is an inquiry relevant in practical terms to all defendants
convicted of capital crimes. It involves a consideration of a number of
factors relating to both the nature of the offense and the offender,
factors which can have a cumulative effect and can be weighed and
judged in relation to one another.
By contrast, the three mitigating circumstances included in the
Ohio statutes, because of their natures or their narrow interpretations,
cannot or are not likely to lead to meaningful mitigation inquiries
in all or even most capital cases. The Ohio statutes do not authorize
a broad inquiry into the overall character of the offender or his of-
fense. While a number of factors may be considered in determining
whether a defendant is, for instance, mentally deficient, the ultimate
inquiry is still quite narrow. The Texas statute, then, may be suffi-
ciently different from the Ohio statute to be distinguishable.
The narrowness of the mitigating factors in Ohio's statute might
be ameliorated somewhat if evidence in mitigation could have a cumu-
lative effect, thus permitting the sentencing authority to consider all
the evidence adduced as a totality. But, because each factor must be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence in order for it to play any
role in the sentencing decision, mitigation is essentially an all or noth-
ing proposition. The defendant must meet the "fifty-plus" percent
mark on at least one of the three mitigation circumstances in order
to have his sentence reduced. Since the sentencing authority is not
authorized, for example, to determine whether the evidence in mitiga-
tion outweighs the evidence of aggravation, evidence falling short of
the "fifty-plus" percent mark is irrelevant to the sentencing decision,
thus further limiting the breadth of the inquiry into mitigation.
Thus, there is good reason to believe that the Ohio statutes do
not "allow for consideration of whatever mitigating circumstances
may be relevant to either the particular offender or the particular of-
fense," as required by the United States Supreme Court."8 2 The Su-
preme Court of the United States has repeatedly held that it is a vio-
lation of the eighth amendment for a state to legislatively predeter-
mine that every defendant convicted of even a narrowly defined
capital crime18 3 shall die. Surely what a state may not do directly
it may not do indirectly by so narrowly defining the circumstances
that will mitigate the death sentence that virtually no defendant will
be able to take advantage of them. Such a scheme, though not iden-
tical to the mandatory schemes previously struck down by the Supreme
Court, certainly seems more closely akin to a mandatory death penalty
scheme than to the capital sentencing schemes upheld by the Supreme
182. Harry Roberts v. Louisiana, 97 S. CL 1993, 1996 (1977).
183. But see note 3 supra.
19771
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Court. The Ohio Supreme Court's bald statement that there is "no
distinction of constitutional dimensions between Ohio's mitigating
factors . . . and those upheld in Proffitt v. Florila"' 8 4 is scarcely a
convincing response.85
2. The Adequacy of Appellate Review 186
In Proffitt, Gregg, and Jurek, the United States Supreme Court
stressed the importance of appellate review of cases in which the death
sentence is imposed. It felt that appellate review insures both ac-
curacy in the fact-finding process and proportionality in sentencing--
that the sentence is not "disproportionate compared to those sentences
imposed in similar cases."' 8 7 The question arises, then, whether Ohio's
death penalty scheme authorizes adequate appellate review of sen-
tencing.
In State v. Bayless, the Ohio Supreme Court claimed the authority
to review sentences in capital cases:
[T]his court has a particular opportunity and responsibility to assure that
death sentences, which may be brought to this court for review as a
matter of right, are not imposed arbitrarily and capriciously. We have
in this case, and will in all capital cases, independently review [sit] the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by the facts of each
case to assure ourselves that capital sentences are airly imposed by
Ohio's trial judges. 188
Although at first glance this statement would seem to warrant the
broad type of appellate review approved in Gregg, the actual scope of
review, as demonstrated by the performance of the Ohio Supreme
Court, is much narrower.
As a starting point, it is illuminating to observe that the Ohio
Supreme Court has yet to hold that a death sentence was inappropri-
ate in any given case. To date, twenty-four cases in which the death
sentence was imposed have been reviewed by the court, and in none
was the death sentence found disproportionate to the crime or the
criminal. 89 In fact, from the treatment given the cases on review, it
184. State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St. 2d 73, 86-87, 357 N.E.2d 1035, 1046 (1976).
185. The Ohio Supreme Court in more recent cases has declined to consider in greater
depth its original position. State v. Weind, 50 Ohio St. 2d 224. 225-26. 364 N.E,2d 224. 227
(1977); State v. Alberta Osborne, 49 Ohio St. 2d 135, 146-47, 359 N.E.2d 7K. 86 (1976).
186. For a discussion of this issue, see Brief of Amicus Curiae, %ultra note 102. at 48-52,
187. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976). See note 66 supra and accompanying
text.
188. 48 Ohio St. 2d 73, 86, 357 N.E.2d 1035, 1045 (1976).
189. See note 6 supra, for a list of cases in which the death s(-ntence was imposed, In
addition to those cases, death was imposed in the following cases reviewed by the Ohio Supreme
Court: State v. Bates, 48 Ohio St. 2d 315, 358 N.E.2d 584 (1976). 3nd State v. Robert,, 48
Ohio St. 2d 221, 358 N.E.2d 530 (1976). Death was also imposed on the defendant in State v.
James Lockett, 49 Ohio St. 2d 71, 358 N.E.2d 1062 (1976). but his conviction was reversed
because of an unrelated evidentiary matter.
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seems clear that the Ohio Supreme Court does not actually engage
in a proportionality review. At best, the review is limited to de-
termining whether the conviction (i.e., the finding of guilt of the
principal charge and at least one aggravating circumstance) and
sentence (i.e., the finding against the defendant on all three matters of
mitigation) are supported by the evidence. In State v. Edwards,
the Ohio Supreme Court, when reviewing evidence claimed by the
defendant to prove "mental deficiency" and thus mitigation, said:
"In criminal appeals, this court will not retry issues of fact. In the
circumstances at hand, we confine our consideration to a determina-
tion of whether there is sufficient substantial evidence to support the
verdict rendered."' 90  More recently, in State v. Weind, the Ohio
Supreme Court, rejecting a claim of mitigation due to mental defi-
ciency, bluntly indicated the scope of review undertaken: "Having
reviewed the psychiatric reports and the evidence adduced at the
mitigation hearing, this court finds no abuse qf discretion of the trial
court in finding that the offense was not primarily the product of
Weind's psychosis or mental deficiency."'
91
Even this narrow review is not always diligently performed. For
example, in State v. Woods, the court was attempting to discern
whether or not the defendant's claim that mitigation had been proved
was correct. The court's effort, however, was hampered: "One diffi-
culty in considering the claims for mitigation in this case is that the
pre-sentence report required to be made by the statute does not appear
in the record."' 92  Yet the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the sentence
of death. It is difficult to understand how the court could adequately
review the trial court's finding of no mitigation without all the rele-
vant evidence before it. Moreover, in some cases, the Ohio Supreme
Court has affirmed the death sentence without mentioning aggravating
or mitigating circumstances at all,' 93 or with merely an off-hand
mention of them, 94 thus violating its own requirement set forth in
Bayless.195  Nor has the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the death
sentence when there was doubt whether the trial court correctly de-
fined the mitigating circumstances. 96 Indeed, the Ohio Supreme
190. 49 Ohio St. 2d 31, 47, 358 N.E.2d 1051. 1062 (1976).
191. 50 Ohio St. 2d 224, 233, 364 N.E.2d 224. 23!1 (1977) (emphasis added).
192. 48 Ohio St 2d 127, 134 n.2, 357 N.E.2d 1059. 1064 n.2 (1976).
193. State v. Shelton, 51 Ohio St. 2d 68. 364 N.E.2d 1152 (1977). State %. Do%%ns. 51 Ohio
St. 2d 47, 364 N.E.2d 1140 (1977).
194. State v. Jackson, 50 Ohio St. 2d 253, 259. 364 N.E.2d 236. 241 (1977): State %. Carl
Osborne, 50 Ohio St. 2d 211, 222-23. 364 N.E.2d 216. 224 (1977): State v. Alberta Osborne. 49
Ohio St. 2d 135, 144, 359 N.E.2d 78, 85 (1976).
195. See text accompanying note 188 supra.
196. In State v. Carl Osborne, the defendant sought a new sentencing hearing on the
ground that the trial court failed to state what definition of "duress" and "coercion" it %as
using at the mitigation hearing. The situation was described as follo%%s:
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Court has held that trial courts need not specify the definitions of
mitigating circumstances they employ. 97  Obviously, careful and
systematic appellate review, even simply for accuracy, is impossible
under such circumstances.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the Ohio Supreme Court
makes no serious effort to determine whether the death sentence is
appropriate for any particular offense and any particular offender. In
no instance has the Ohio Supreme Court compared the facts of a given
case with those of other relevant cases in which the death sentence
was imposed to determine whether imposing death would be propor-
tionate to the offense.1
98
By comparison, the Georgia Supreme Court, pursuant to the
death penalty provisions upheld in Gregg, "is required to specify in
its opinion the similar cases which it took into consideration" in
determining whether the death sentence is disproportionate in any
given case, and is authorized to consider other cases in which the
death penalty was imposed and appealed cases in which life sentence,
rather than death was imposed. 99 The Georgia Supreme Court, at
the time Gregg was decided, had actually reversed death sentences
for being disproportionate in a given case, including the death sen-
tence Gregg himself received under the robbery counts of which he
had also been convicted.20° Similarly, the United States Supreme
Court found in Proffitt that the Florida Supreme Court actively engages
in proportionality review, as evidenced by the fact that it had re-
versed a considerable number of death sentences. 2 1  The Ohio
Supreme Court has yet to reverse a death sentence for any reason,
At the mitigation hearing, the trial court made reference to tl'e prosecution'& closing
argument. Therein, the assistant prosecutor apparently looked to a common law
definition of duress and coercion. Because the trial court cited the assistant prosecu-
tor's argument, appellant deems it probable that the trial court wrongly applied the
common law definition. We disagree.
.. .We have examined the relevant portions of the transcript and conclude that
the reference to the assistant prosecutor's argument did not demonstrate reliance by
the trial court upon an erroneous definition of duress and coercion.
50 Ohio St. 2d 211, 221, 364 N.E.2d 216, 223 (1977).
197. "The court does not hold that, as a general rule, a trial court's mitigation hearing
discussion of duress and coercion must include an explicit definition of these terms," IL
In view of the fact that the statute relating to mitigation has only recently been authorita-
tively interpreted, and that the Ohio Supreme Court has changed its interpretation mid-
stream, see text following note 162 supra. the likelihood that some incorrect definitions have
been employed is substantial.
198. The Ohio Supreme Court does not consider either cases in which the death penalty
has been imposed or cases in which the death penalty was available but not imposed, for the
purposes of comparison. Contrast the practices of the Georgia and Florida Supreme Courts
described in text accompanying notes 199-201 infra.
199. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204 n.56 (1976).
200. See note 67 supra.
201. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253, 259 (1976). "The Supreme Court of Florida.
like that of Georgia, has not hesitated to vacate a death sentence when it has determined the
sentence should not have been imposed. Indeed. it has vacated eight of the 21 death sen-
tences that it has reviewed to date." Id. at 253.
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let alone because the penalty of death was disproportionate to a given
offense. Given the type of appellate review actually employed by
the court, it is doubtful it ever will. To illustrate this point, one case
in particular, State v. Sandra Lockett,202 is noteworthy.
In that case, the defendant, Sandra Lockett, along with Nathan
Dew, Al Parker, and James Lockett, devised a plan to rob a local pawn
shop. The robbery was to be committed by Dew, Parker, and James
Lockett, while Sandra Lockett waited outside in the getaway car.
None of the four had a weapon, but Parker had four cartridges. A
plan was therefore devised whereby Parker would ask the pawn shop
owner to see a pistol that would accommodate the cartridges Parker
had. Parker would then load the gun and use it to rob the owner of
the pawn shop.
The robbery was carried out according to plan until Parker pointed
the gun at the pawn shop owner. The owner unexpectedly grabbed
for the gun, and it fired, killing him. The trio left the pawn shop and
split up, with only Parker returning to the car in which Sandra Lockett
was waiting. Later, he told Sandra what had transpired at the pawn
shop.
203
Parker, the triggerman, pleaded guilty to aggravated murder
without specifications and thus received a life sentence.?"3 Sandra
was prosecuted for aggravated murder with specifications under
Ohio's complicity statute.20 5 She stood trial and was sentenced to
death. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death
sentence despite Sandra's claim that the prosecution had failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt either her or Parker's intent to kill.
The court held that when
the participants in the offense entered into a common design to commit
the armed robbery by the use of force, violence and a deadly weapon
and all the participants were aware that an inherently dangerous in-
strumentality was to be employed to accomplish the felonious purpose,
rthen,] a homicide occurring during the commission of the felony is a
natural -and probable consequence of the common plan which must be
presumed to have been intended. .... 206
202. 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 358 N.E.2d 1062 (1976), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 261 (1977). For a
perceptive treatment of the Lockett case, see Black, 77e Death Penalty Now. 51 Tt.L. L RE%.
429 (1977).
203. 49 Ohio St. 2d at 51-53, 358 N.E.2d at 1066-67.
204. State v. James Lockett, 49 Ohio St. 2d 71. 72, 358 N.E.2d 1062, 1078 (1976).
205. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.03 (Page 1975) reads in relevant part:
(A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of
an offense, shall do any of the following.
(2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense:
(F) Whoever violates this section is guilty of complicity in the commission of an
offense, and shall be prosecuted and punished as if he were a principal offender ....
206. State v. Sandra Lockett, 49 Ohio St. 2d at 48. 358 N.E.2d at 1065 (s llabus 3)
(emphasis added).
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To the dissent, the court established a "conclusive judicial
presumption that one person had the specific intent to commit murder,
because his confederate had such intent. ' 7  The dissenters argued
that imposing the death sentence on an aider and abettor solely on
the basis of "imputed guilt" was disproportionate to the offense and
therefore unconstitutional.2 8 The majority, however, refused to con-
sider whether the punishment fit the crime, despite the fact that
"rt]here was no evidence that the defendant or the other participants
in the robbery had an actual purpose or intent to kill. '20 9 The court,
finding no mitigation,210 upheld the death sentence. Thus Sandra, the
driver of the getaway car, was condemned to die while Parker, the
triggerman, received a life sentence.2
In practice, then, the Ohio Supreme Court does not attempt to
guarantee that similar results are reached in similar cases. Unlike
the Florida and Georgia Supreme Courts, which undertake active ap-
pellate review, 21 2 the Ohio Supreme Court engages "in only cursory
or rubber-stamp review '21 3 of the decisions of trial judges in Ohio.
When the difference is between life and death, the ultimate decision
should not be left, unchecked, to the broad discretion and idiosyn-
crasies of sentencing authorities. The only way to insure the uniform
application of the death penalty, while still having regard for the par-
ticular characteristics of the offense and the offender, mandated by
Furman, Gregg, and Woodson, is to have careful scrutiny of death sen-
tences on a statewide level, to check for accuracy2 " and proportional-
ity. To the extent that similar results are not reached in similar cases,
207. Id. at 70, 358 N.E.2d at 1076 (Stem, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 67, 68-71, 358 N.E.2d at 1076-77 (Stern, J.. dissenting). See Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), in which the defendant Woodson, like Sandra Lockett,
was not the principal offender. The Court stated that since Woodson's death sentence was
overturned, it was "unnecessary to reach the question whether impofition of the death penalty
on petitioner Woodson would have been so disproportionate to the nature of his involvement
in the capital offense as independently to violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments"
Id. at 305 n.40. The Court referred to Gregg, in which it had stated. "[W]hen a life has been
taken deliberately by the offender, we cannot say that the punishment [of death] is invariably
disproportionate to the crime." 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
209. State v. Sandra Lockett, 49 Ohio St. 2d at 67, 358 N.E.2d at 1075 (Stern, J.. dis-
senting).
210. Id. at 67, 358 N.E.2d at 1075.
211. Compare State v. Farmer, 73 Ohio Op. 2d 341 (C.P. Montgomery Cty. 1975), in which
the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment rather than to death. The court focused
on the fact that the defendant was not a principal offender:
The Court, in exercising its discretion, is influenced considerably by the fact that
the defendant's guilt was based upon the aider and abettor theory of law as retained
in the conspiracy and complicity section of the new code. This defendant was not the
principal offender except as to the aggravated robbery.
Id. at 345. The Ohio Supreme Court made no reference to this case.
212. See notes 199-201 supra and accompanying text.
213. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259 (1976).
214. In this regard, see, e.g., State v. Miller, 49 Ohio St, 198, 361 N.E.2d 419 (1977), in
which a conviction and death sentence were affirmed despite the fact that the evidence against
the defendant was meager.
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the Ohio statutes permit the kind of arbitrariness in imposing the death
penalty that was condemned in Furman. Because of the failure of the
Supreme Court of Ohio to engage in adequate appellate review, there
is serious doubt whether the Ohio statutes comply with the eighth
amendment standards set out by the United States Supreme Court.2 15
3. Conclusion
The statutes upheld in Gregg, Jurek, and Proitt mark the consti-
tutionally acceptable middle ground between completely open-ended
sentencing provisions on the one hand and mandatory sentencing pro-
visions on the other. The Ohio death penalty statutes fit somewhere
between this middle ground and mandatory sentencing. Although the
Ohio Supreme Court found Ohio's death penalty scheme sufficiently
close to the statutes upheld in Gregg, Jurek, and Pro fftt to be consti-
tutionally acceptable, it is clear that on its face and as applied Ohio's
scheme does not operate like that of Georgia, Texas, or Florida.
The mitigating factors included in Ohio's capital sentencing stat-
utes are fewer, narrower, and exclusive. Not included among them
are important factors such as the age and record of the offender. The
narrowness and exclusivity of the mitigating factors contained in
Ohio's capital sentencing provisions highly restrict the sentencing au-
thority's inquiry into the relevant characteristics of the offense and
the offender, and thereby insure that virtually all defendants will be
sentenced to death upon conviction of a capital crime. The Ohio Su-
preme Court uses a lax standard in reviewing the accuracy of fact
finding in sentencing decisions, and makes no attempt to determine if
the death sentence is just and appropriate in any particular case,
thus fostering the kind of arbitrariness condemned in Furman. Cer-
tainly, Ohio's death penalty statutes are quite dissimilar from the
statutes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas. What is more, they fall too
far short of the middle ground created in Gregg, Jurek, and Profitt to
meet the eighth amendment standards articulated therein.
215. At times, the court's treatment of the mitigation issue was extremely shallow. In
State v. Alberta Osborne, for example, the defendant asserted that the Ohio death penalty
statutes "are unconstitutional . . . in that the statutes do not require the Supreme Court to
compare the sentences imposed upon similarly situated defendants." 49 Ohio St. 2d 135.
145-46, 359 N.E.2d 78, 86 (1976). The court responded:
As to the first assertion of this proposition, the constitutionality of Ohio's general
scheme was upheld in Bayless . . . and need not be repeated at length here. The Ohio
statutes require the death sentence to be imposed upon all defendants convicted of
aggravated murder coupled with at least one of seven aggravating circumstances, pro-
vided that none of the three mitigating factors exist. All similarly situated defendants
are thus sentenced alike.
Id. at 146, 359 N.E.2d at 86.
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III. RELATED CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE
OHIO DEATH PENALTY STATUTE3
In addition to the eighth amendment issues discussed previously,
the Ohio death penalty statutes raise other constitutional issues.
While the resolution of these issues does not involve an application of
the standards of Furman or Gregg, their resolution is essential to a
complete assessment of the constitutionality of the Ohio statutes.
Specifically, the three issues to be discussed are: (1) whether it is con-
stitutional to place on the defendant the burden of proving mitigation;
(2) whether it is constitutional to require that a judge or a three-judge
panel rather than a jury decide if mitigation is proved; and (3) whether
the Ohio statutes place an unconstitutional burden on the right to a
jury trial.
A. Placing on the Defendant the Burden of Proving Mitigation2t
The Ohio death penalty scheme requires the defendant to bear the
burden of proving mitigation.217 In State v. Sandra Lockett,"' State
v. Carl Osborne,2t 9 and State v. Downs, 220 the Ohio Supreme Court
considered this provision; in each case, the court upheld it against con-
stitutional attack. The court in its analysis221 addressed the two basic
216. For a discussion of this issue, see Brief of Amicus Curiae. supra note 102. at 52-60.
For a general treatment of the problem of allocating the burden of proof in criminal cases, see
Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cascs, 86
YALE L.J. 1299 (1977).
217. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (Page 1975); State v. Downs. 51 Ohio St. 2d 47.
55, 364 N.E.2d 1140, 1146 (1977).
218. 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 358 N.E.2d 1062 (1976), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 261 (1977),
219. 50 Ohio St. 2d 211, 364 N.E.2d 216 (1977).
220. 51 Ohio St. 2d 47, 364 N.E.2d 1140 (1977).
221. Of all the constitutional attacks made upon the Ohio death penalty scheme, this
issue produced the most confusing responses from the Ohio Supreme Court, In State v,
Sandra Lockett, for example, the court ignored the relevant United States Supreme Court cases
on the issue. See notes 226-31 infra and accompanying text. In other cases, the court avoided
the issue by apparently stating that no one bears the burden of proof at the mitigation hearing,
State v. Carl Osborne, 50 Ohio St. 2d 211, 222, 364 N.E.2d 216, 223 (1977) ("Furthermore,
the record clearly establishes that no evidentiary burden was placed upon appellant at his
mitigation hearing, and we do not accept his argument that constitutional standards require
that such a burden be affirmatively lodged with the state."); State v. Weind, 50 Ohio St, 2d 224.
226-27, 364 N.E.2d 224, 228 (1977) ("The court does not reach this issle since the record reveals
that such burden was not placed on the accused. In fact, the trial judge, in response to a
question by the defense concerning who had the burden of proof at the mitigation hearing,
stated that: '[I]nasmuch as there is no burden, I will suggest that the state go first.' "); State v.
Downs, 51 Ohio St. 2d 47, 53, 364 N.E.2d 1140, 1145 (1977) ("A careful examination of the
record in both Lockett and Woods reveals that the trial court did not in either case '[require
the] defendant convicted of aggravated murder to prove certain mitigating circumstances by a
preponderance of the evidence in order to be sentenced to life imprisonment, rather than to
death . ). The court may have meant that the trial court in each case required the state to
disprove mitigation, but that certainly was not the standard used on review.
Perhaps Justice Celebrezze's concurring opinion in State v. Downs contains one of the
most cryptic statements:
Although it is true that one already convicted of aggravated murder, with a specifica.
tion thereto, must shoulder the risk of non-persuasion at the mitigation hearing, such
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areas of concern raised by Ohio's statute: (1) the general due process
limitations on the allocation of the burden of proof in criminal cases;
and (2) the eighth amendment limitations on the allocation of the bur-
den of proving mitigation in capital cases.
The first area of concern involves the limitations placed by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment2 22 upon a state's power to
place on a criminal defendant the burden of proving a particular fact.
The argument that Ohio's mitigation statute violates the due process
clause by requiring a capital defendant to prove mitigation rests upon
two decisions of the United States Supreme Court, In re Winship
2 23
and Mullaney v. Wilbur. 4  A recent United States Supreme Court
decision, Patterson v. New York,225 however, has substantially under-
mined the argument by drastically limiting, if not overruling, Mullaney.
Consequently, the discussion of this issue will be abbreviated, sketch-
ing only its broad outlines.
Simply put, Winship held that the due process clause "protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged."226 The scope of the facts to be proved by the prosecution
was seemingly expanded in Mullaney.227  Although Mullaney could
hearing is not an adversary proceeding, and neither the prosecution nor the convicted
murderer bears any burden of proof with reference to mitigating circumstances.
51 Ohio St. 2d at 67, 364 N.E.2d at 1152 (Celebrezze, J., concurring).
222. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 2.
223. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
224. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
225. 97 S.Ct. 2319 (1977).
226. 397 U.S. at 364. The Court specifically held that, in a juvenile proceding, the state
must prove juvenile delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by a preponderance of
the evidence as was the practice prior to Winship. The Court felt that the stigma and possible
loss of liberty attendant upon an adjudication of delinquency required the use of the same
standard of proof as is used in criminal cases.
227. Mullaney involved a procedure of the State of Maine that required a defendant to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was acting in the heat of passion in order
to reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter. Maine's murder statute defined murder as an
unlawful killing "with malice aforethought, either express or implied," ME. REv. STAT. A'%.,
fit. 17, § 2651 (1964), while Maine's manslaughter statute defined manslaughter as an unlawful
killing "in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice
aforethought," id. § 2551." Under both statutes the killing had to be intentional and unlawful
(i.e., without justification or excuse); what distinguished murder from manslaughter was the
element of malice aforethought. But, under Maine law
if the prosecution established that the homicide was both intentional and unlawful.
malice aforethought was to be conclusively implied unless the defendant proved by a
fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden
provocation. The [trial] court [in Mullaney] emphasized that "malice aforethought and
heat of passion on sudden provocation are two inconsistent things,' . . . thus, by
proving the latter the defendant would negate the former and reduce the homicide from
murder to manslaughter.
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 686-87 (1975) (footnote omitted).
When the defendant Wilbur challenged this procedure under IWinship-claiming that the
state, by presuming malice aforethought, was relieved of the burden of proving an element of
murder-the highest court of Maine decided that no essential element of guilt was presumed.
It concluded that under Maine law, murder and manslaughter were not separate crimes:
rather, there was but a single generic offense of felonious homicide, with murder and man-
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h ive been decided on a narrower ground,228 the broad language used
by the Court lent itself to the interpretation that even if a particular
fact were not technically related to guilt or innocence of a particular
crime, but rather to the degree of punishment, the state would neverthe-
less be required to disprove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt if
significantly different consequences in terms of punishment or moral
221
culpability depended upon the fact's existence or nonexistence.
slaughter representing subcategories for the purposes of punishment only. The feature dis-
tinguishing murder from manslaughter-killing with malice aforethought rather than in the heat
of passion-was not seen, then, as an element of guilt, but rather as a reductive factor for tile
purposes of punishment. Id. at 687-88.
228. The United States Supreme Court stated that it was bound by the Maine Supreme
Court's interpretation of Maine law. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. at 690-91, But the Court
need not have accepted that interpretation if it suspected that the Supreme Court of Maine
had tampered with the statutory definition of murder in order to circumvent Winship's holding,
The Court could have rejected the Maine Supreme Court's ruling by relying on the doctrine of
Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938), which held that the United States Su-
preme Court may refuse to accept as binding, state court interprewtions of state law that lack
a fair and substantial basis, when the resolution of the issue of s,,ate law removes a premise
for a federal claim from the case. The standard is articulated in I)emorest v. City Bank Co.,
321 U.S. 36, 42 (1944):
Even though the constitutional protection invoked be denied on nonfederal grounds, it
is the province of this Court to inquire whether the decision Df the state court rests
upon a fair or substantial basis. If unsubstantial, constitutional obligations may not
be thus evaded. But if there is no evasion of the constitutional issue, and the nonled-
eral ground of decision has fair support, this Court will not inquire whether the rule
applied by the state court is right or wrong, or substitute its own view of what should
be deemed the better rule, for that of the state court.
Indeed, both the federal district court and the court of appeals that heard the defendant Wil-
bur's habeas corpus action rejected the interpretation of state law g yen by the Maine Supreme
Court. Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F.2d 943, 947 (1st Cir. 1973). vacated, 414 US. 1139 (1974):
Wilbur v. Robbins, 349 F. Supp. 149, 152-53 (D. Maine 1972), a,d stfb norn. Wilbur v, Mullaney,
473 F.2d 943 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974).
Thus, the Court could have found, contrary to the holding of the Maine Supreme Court,
that murder was a separate offense of which malice aforethought was an element, and that
Maine law, by presuming malice aforethought unless the defendant negated it by proving
provocation, violated Winship by not requiring the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
every element of the crime. The Court apparently felt it unnecessary to redetermine the law
of the State of Maine since it was willing to reach the due process issue in any event, Set'
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. at 691 n. 11.
229. In Mullaney. the Court focused on the fact "that the consequences resulting from
a verdict of murder, as compared with a verdict of manslaughtei, differ significantly." 421
U.S. at 698. (Punishment for manslaughter under Maine law ranged from a fine of 1000 dol-
lars to imprisonment for twenty years. Punishment for murder was life imprisonment. Id.
at 698. 700.)
The Court rejected the notion that because proof of manslaughter would not wholly
exonerate the defendant, it was permissible to require the defendant to bear the burden of
proof on that issue. The Court stated:
This analysis fails to recognize that the criminal law of Maine. like that of other ju-
risdictions, is concerned not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract but also with
the degree of criminal culpability. Maine has chosen to distinluish those who kill in
the heat of passion from those who kill in the absence of this factar. Because the former
are less "blameworthfy]," . . . they are subject to substantially less severe penalties,
By drawing this distinction, while refusing to require the prosecution to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt the fact upon which it turns, Maine denigrates the interest
found critical in Winship.
Id. at 697-98. The Court also found that the defendant's interest, and society's interest, in
a reliable verdict outweighed the state's interest in avoiding the difficulties of negating heat
of passion. Because of the disparity of consequences depending upon whether the defendant
could or could not prove heat of passion, the Supreme Court felt it fundamentally unfair to
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Thus read, Mullaney would appear to apply to the Ohio death
penalty scheme since the existence or nonexistence of mitigation,
though not an element of guilt,230 nevertheless spells the difference
between life and death-a drastic difference in consequences. The
Ohio Supreme Court, however, in State v. Downs, handed down be-
fore Patterson was decided, rejected the argument that Ohio's death
penalty scheme runs afoul of Mullaney.
231
Of greater significance than the Ohio Supreme Court's holding
in Downs, however, is Patterson v. New York. In Patterson, the
United States Supreme Court held that, within certain broad limits,
the only facts that a state is required to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt are those elements specifically included in the statutory defi-
232nition of a particular crime. The defendant may be required to
permit a defendant to be punished for murder when it was as likely as not that he should only
be punished for manslaughter. Id. at 699-702.
230. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the argument that lack of mitigation is an element
of guilt of aggravated murder. State v. Downs, 51 Ohio St. 2d 47, 57, 59, 364 N.E.2d 1140,
1147-48 (1977). Stated more fully the argument is that Ohio's law of homicide includes
murder, aggravated murder without specifications-punishable by life imprisonment, aggravated
murder with specifications and mitigation-punishable by life imprisonment, and aggravated
murder with specifications and no mitigation-punishable by death. Viewed in this light, the
lack of mitigation would be an "essential element of guilt" of the crime of aggravated murder
with specifications and no mitigation, and thus would have to be proved by the state beyond a
reasonable doubt.
231. 51 Ohio St. 2d 47, 57, 364 N.E.2d 1140, 1147 (1977): "Although this court recog-
nizes that some of the principles in Mullaney might be applied to the provisions of R. C.
2929.04(B), we do not find it persuasive authority for the defendant's position:' The court ex-
plained:
In Mullaney, the court's analysis was based upon an historical examination of the con-
cepts of homicide and provocation .... A similar analysis of the death penalty and a
consideration of those factors relevant to mitigation show a radically different genesis
and development. . . . In light of the historical dissimilarities between the issues of
provocation in homicides and of mitigation in death sentences, the constitutional re-
quirements for judicial resolution of those issues differ.
Id. at 57-58, 364 N.E.2d at 1147. Apparently, the court believed that since historically the
lack of mitigating circumstances has not been the criterion for distinguishing those defendants
who suffer the death penalty from those who do not, Mullaney would have no application
to allocating the burden of proving mitigation in capital cases.
When the court first considered the burden of proof issue in State v. Sandra Lockett. how-
ever, it totally ignored both Winship and Mullaney. The court rejected the constitutional at-
tack out of hand without citing any authority, claiming that, since the mitigating circumstances
relate to the extent of punishment and not to guilt or innocence, the state need not disprove
mitigation. State v. Sandra Lockett, 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 65-66, 358 N.E.2d 1062, 1074 (1976).
cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 261 (1977).
232. In Patterson, the constitutionality of New York's second degree murder statute whas
called into question. Under that statute, second degree murder is defined as intentionally
causing the death of another person. N.Y. PEN4AL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1967). Malice
aforethought is not explicitly a statutory element of the crime. The statute, however. provides
for an affirmative defense that the defendant acted under extreme emotional disturbance. Id.
This defense is characterized in the manslaughter statute as a mitigating circumstance reducing
murder to manslaughter. Id. § 125.20. The defendant bears the burden of proving this defense
by.a preponderance of the evidence. Patterson v. New York, 97 S. CL 2319, 2322 (1977). The
Supreme Court stated:
To recognize at all a mitigating circumstance does not require the State to prove its
nonexistence in each case in which the fact is put in issue, if in its judgment this would
be too cumbersome, too expensive, and too inaccurate.
We thus decline to adopt as a constitutional imperative, operative country-wide,
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prove other facts that could reduce the charge or mitigate punishment,
regardless of the differences in consequences that would result if
those facts existed.233  Thus, although not expressly overruling Mul-
laney, Patterson would seem to virtually limit it to its facts. 234 There-
fore it is likely that an argument based solely on a broad reading of
Mullaney would not be successful.
The potential lack of success of an argument based on Mullanev,
however, does not necessarily imply that the due process principles
governing the allocation of the burden of proof in criminal cases are
totally without application to the Ohio mitigation statute. In In re
Winship, the due-process requirement that a state prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt was based on the severe consequences that may
attend upon conviction of a crime and the resulting need for a high
degree of reliability in fact finding. Justice Harlan, in his concurring
opinion in Winship, pointed out that
a standard of proof represents an attempt to instruct the factfinder con-
cerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in
the correctness of factual conclusions for a particul.r type of adjudica-
tion. . . .[T]he requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a
criminal case [is] bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our
that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any
and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused. . . .We therefore
will not disturb the balance struck in previous cases holding that the Due Process
Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt all of the elements
included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is vhargcd ...
This view may seem to permit state legislatures to reallocate burdens of proof
by labeling as affirmative defenses at least some elements of the crimes now defined
in their statutes. But there are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the
States may not go in this regard. "[I]t is not within the province of a legislature to
declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime." . . . The legislature
cannot "validly command that the finding of an indictment, or irere proof of the iden-
tity of the accused, should create a presumption of the existence of all the facts cs-
sential to guilt."
Id. at 2326-27.
233. Cf. Rivera v. Delaware, 97 S. Ct. 226 (1976) (appeal attacking constitutionality of
state scheme requiring criminal defendant to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence
dismissed for want of substantial federal question); Leland v. Ore-zon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952)
(state may require criminal defendant to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt).
234. Patterson certainly overrules the rationale of Mullaney and would seem to read
Mullanev as if it had been decided on the narrow ground described in note 228 supra. See
the dissenting opinion of Justice Powell, the author of Mullane, in Patterson: "The Court
manages to run a constitutional boundary line through the barely visible space that separates
Maine's law from New York's. It does so on the basis of distinctions in language that are
formalistic rather than substantive. . . . [Its] explanation of the Mullanev holding bears little
relationship to the basic rationale of that decision." 97 S. Ct. 2319, 2333 (1977) (Powell, J.,
dissenting). The defendant in Patterson argued that "New York's murder statute is function-
ally equivalent to the one struck down in Mullaney'." Id. at 2322. The Supreme Court,
however, distinguished Mullaney by stating that under Maine law "[p]remeditation was not
within the definition of murder; but malice, in the sense of the ab!,ence of provocation, was
part of the definition of that crime." Id. at 2330. But, as the Maine Supreme Court inter-
preted Maine law, murder and manslaughter were not separate crimes in Maine and the ab-
sence of provocation was not an element of the crime of felonious homicide-a holding that the
Supreme Court purportedly accepted.
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society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty
man go free.23
5
While it is true that Winship was concerned specifically with how
weighty the burden of proof, already allocated to the prosecution,
should be,236 rather than upon whom that burden should be placed in
the first instance, the reliability rationale underlying Winship has par-
ticular force in the context of capital sentencing. Reliability of fact
finding is crucial at the mitigation stage of a capital case, for upon that
fact finding the life of the defendant depends. As the Supreme Court
of the United States stated in Woodson v. North Carolina:
[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of impris-
onment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life im-
prisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year
or two. Because of that. qualitative difference, there is a corresponding
difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is
the appropriate punishment in a specific case.237
The eighth amendment principles governing the role of mitigation
in capital cases also disfavor requiring the defendant to establish miti-
gation. A consideration of mitigating circumstances, as well as ag-
gravating circumstances, has been held by the United States Supreme
Court to be a constitutionally indispensable part of inflicting the
penalty of death. 238 Given the crucial nature of the mitigation inquiry,
it would seem that requiring the state to disprove mitigation would
maximize the ability of sentencing authorities to consider all relevant
evidence in mitigation of the sentence of death. Under Ohio's statute,
however, the sentencer's assessment of mitigation is restricted to the
extent that mitigating evidence can play no role in the sentencing
decision unless it meets the preponderance standard. 2" Under Ohio's
statute, if it is equally likely that mitigation has been proved as that
it has not been proved, the defendant will die. Consequently Ohio's
allocation of the burden of proving mitigation can be said to denigrate
the constitutionally critical mitigation inquiry.
The Ohio Supreme Court's treatment of this eighth amendment
issue is sparse. In response to the argument that Ohio's statute violates
Winship and Mullaney, the court said: "We find no authority in
Mullaney or in any of the recently promulgated death cases decided
by the United States Supreme Court to support the proposition that
the lack of mitigating factors is an additional, constitutionally man-
dated element of a capital offense. 240  Presumably, the court meant
235. 397 U.S. 358, 370, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
236. See note 226 supra.
237. 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
238. See notes 100-01 supra and accompanying text.
239. See text preceding note 182 supra.
240. State v. Downs, 51 Ohio St. 2d 47, 59, 364 N.E.2d 1140, 1148 (1977).
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that the state need not prove lack of mitigation in order to convict of
a capital crime. Yet the court never mentioned the crucial point:
that a lack of mitigation is a constitutionally mandated prerequisite
to imposing the death penalty. The only argumert the court offered
in support of Ohio's statute was that the Supreme Court of the United
States upheld Florida's capital sentencing provision, which arguably
requires the defendant to prove mitigation by a preponderance of the
evidence. The Florida statute requires the jury to consider "[w]hether
sufficient mitigating circumstances exist .. .which outweigh the ag-
gravating circumstances found to exist. '24' The fact that this provi-
sion, which seems to require that the defendant prove mitigation by
a preponderance of the evidence, was upheld in Profltt v. Florida, led
the Ohio Supreme Court to conclude that placing the burden of
proving mitigation on the defendant is not unconstitutional.242
In response, however, two points must be made. First, the burden
of proof issue was neither expressly raised nor directly faced or de-
cided by the Court in Proffitt. Thus, the Proffitt decision in this con-
text may not be a reliable indicator of the Court's position. Second,
the Florida statute upheld in Proffitt is considerably different from
Ohio's mitigation statute.243 The Florida statute permits a broad in-
quiry into mitigating circumstances and authorizes a consideration of
many mitigating factors, including the age and record of the defen-
dant. As the burden of proof is apparently allocated, the mitigating
factors may have a cumulative effect. Thus, requiring that the miti-
gating factors outweigh aggravating factors may not so restrict the
mitigation inquiry as to render the statute violative of the eighth
amendment.
Ohio's statute, on the other hand, authorizes a much narrower
inquiry into mitigating circumstances; only three factors are relevant
and they cannot have a cumulative effect. Assuming arguendo that
the mitigating factors in the Ohio statute are not unconstitutionally
narrow, nevertheless requiring the defendant to prove mitigation by a
preponderance may restrict the already narrow mitigation inquiry to
a degree intolerable under the eighth amendment. For the more re-
strictive the inquiry into mitigating circumstances, the more similar
to a mandatory death penalty the Ohio scheme becomes. For this
reason, and because of the special need for utmost reliability of fact
finding in capital sentencing, the failure of the Ohio statute to require
the prosecution to disprove mitigation may well render the statute un-
constitutional.
241. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)(b) (West Supp. 1976-77).
242. State v. Downs, 51 Ohio St. 2d 47, 59-60, 364 N.E.2d 1140, 1148 (1977).
243. See note 176 supra and accompanying text.
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B. Jury Sentencing
Another problem raised by the Ohio death penalty statutes is
their failure to provide for jury sentencing. 244  In State v. Weind,245
the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the contention that the failure to
provide for jury sentencing violates the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ments as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Wither-
spoon v. Illinois.246 Witherspoon involved a constitutional attack on
an Illinois statute governing the process by which jurors were selected
in capital cases. The statute provided: "In trials for murder it shall
be a cause for challenge of any juror who shall, on being examined,
state that he has conscientious scruples against capital punishment,
or that he is opposed to the same. 247 Under this statute any venire-
man expressing an aversion to the death penalty could be challenged
for cause regardless of whether his views about the death penalty would
impair his ability to render a fair verdict.
248
In striking down this jury-selection technique, the Court stressed
the important function a jury performs in a capital case by bringing
to bear on the sentencing decision contemporary community values, a
function that the Illinois procedure impaired.
But a jury from which all [individuals who oppose the death penalty]
have been excluded cannot perform the task demanded of it. Guided
by neither rule nor standard, "free to select or reject as it [sees] fit," ajury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment
can do little more-and must do nothing less-than express the conscience
of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.2 4 9
In a footnote the Court added:
And one of the most important functions any jury can perform in mak-
ing such a selection [i.e., between the death penalty and life imprison-
ment] is to maintain a link between contemporary community values and
the penal system-a link without which the determination of punishment
244. If the defendant is tried by a jury, his sentence is imposed by the trial judge. If the
defendant is tried by a three-judge panel, that panel imposes sentence. Oino REV. CODE A%.
§ 2929.03(C) (Page 1975).
245. 50 Ohio St. 2d 224, 364 N.E. 2d 224 (1976).
246. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
247. ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, § 743 (1959).
248. The Court noted that its inquiry was a limited one:
The issue before us is a narrow one. It does not involve the right of the prosecu-
tion to challenge for cause those prospective jurors who state that their reservations
about capital punishment would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to
the defendant's guilt. Nor does it involve the State's assertion of a right to exclude from
the jury in a capital case those who say that they could never vote to impose the death
penalty or that they would refuse even to consider its imposition in the case before them.
391 U.S. at 513-14 (footnote omitted).
249. Id. at 519-20 (footnotes omitted). titherspoon was decided before Furman. %hen
juries could be given unbridled discretion to determine sentence in capital cases.
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could hardly reflect "the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."250
The Court held that the Illinois procedure, by ensuring that only one
view about the death penalty would be represented on the jury, denied
"that impartiality to which the petitioner [Witherspoon] was entitled
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.",
251
The attack on the Ohio death penalty statutes for their failure to
provide jury sentencing uses as a point of departure the discussion in
Witherspoon of the jury's role in imposing sentence in capital cases.
The argument urges that the jury--"a significant and reliable objec-
tive index of contemporary values" 252-plays an essential part in the
sentencing decision in capital cases because it "maintain[s] a link be-
tween contemporary community values and the penal system."
2
"1
By allowing the jury to take part in the sentencing decision,2 5 4 the
jury will bring to bear its moral sensibilities in deciding whether a
given defendant deserves to die, and thus will reflect "evolving stan-
dards of decency" in the determination of punishment.
In State v. Weind, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected the con-
tention that "the Ohio death penalty statutes are unconstitutional in
that one accused of a capital offense is denied the right to a judgment
of his peers as to the existence of mitigating circumstances and the
appropriateness of the death penalty." 255 The court stated: "In Prof-
fitt v. Florida .. .the Supreme Court specifically upheld the Florida
sentencing statute in which the jury renders an advisory verdict
while the trial judge makes the actual determination of sentence."256
The court then quoted a passage in Proffitt which, in its opinion,
was dispositive of the issue:
This Court has pointed out that jury sentencing in a capital case can
perform an important societal function, Witherspoon v. Illinois ....
but it has never suggested that jury sentencing is constitutionally re-
quired. And it would appear that judicial sentencing should lead, if
anything, to even greater consistency in the imposition at the trial court
level of capital punishment, since a trial judge is more experienced in
sentencing than a jury, and therefore is better able to impose sentences
similar to those imposed in analogous cases.
257
250. Id. at 519 n.15.
251. Id. at 518.
252. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976).
253. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968).
254. The Court in Witherspoon indicated its decision applied regardless of whether the
jury's recommendation of sentence was binding on the trial judge. 391 L.S. at 518 n.12.
255. 50 Ohio St. 2d 224, 226, 364 N.E.2d 224, 227 (1977).
256. Id.
257. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976) (footnote omitted).
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Proffitt, however, may not be dispositive of the issue. First, the
jury sentencing issue was not a central one in Proffitt, and indeed
was not briefed by the parties. Second, the Florida sentencing pro-
cedure does in fact permit considerable jury input in the sentencing
decision, while, under the Ohio statutes, the jury has no input at all.
The Florida procedure requires the jury in the first instance to
recommend a sentence of life imprisonment or death based on its
weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.258 The miti-
gating circumstances included in Florida's statute in some instances
require consideration of degree, 259 and the ultimate decision whether
mitigating factors outweigh aggravating factors is also a matter of
judgment. In making these determinations, the jury of necessity re-
flects the community conscience with regard to the death penalty
and its appropriateness in any given case. While the jury's decision
is only advisory and the trial judge actually decides what the sen-
tence will be,260 the Florida Supreme Court has stated that 'in or-
der to sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation
of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear
and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ."
26
'
Thus, under the Florida statute, the jury plays a significant role in
bringing the community's moral sensibilities to bear on the sentencing
decision.
The Supreme Court, on a direct and complete examination of the
jury sentencing issue, may be unwilling to uphold a sentencing scheme
that permits no jury input at all. The Court's stress in Gregg and
Coker on looking to community values to determine whether the death
penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment for a given crime262 may
provide another argument for rejecting Ohio's scheme, which ex-
cludes the jury from the sentencing decision altogether. Thus, de-
spite a strong indication to the contrary in Proffitt, the Supreme Court
may find the Ohio statutes unconstitutional for their failure to provide
for some input by the jury in the sentencing decision. 263
258. See note 241 supra and accompanying text.
259. The mitigating factors included in Florida's statute are listed in note 95 supra.
Factors calling for consideration of degree, include, for example, "[t]he age of the defendant."
260. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 249 (1976).
261. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975). Accord, Thompson v. State, 328
So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1975).
262. Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2866-68 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
179-83 (1976).
263. But see Richmond v. Arizona, 21 CRIM. L REP. 4129 (BNA 1977). in which Justice
Rehnquist, in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Ninth Circuit. denied a stay of execution
and suspension of an order denying certiorari: "Appellant argues that the Arizona statute
violates the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in failing to provide for jury input into
the determination of whether aggravating and mitigating circumstances do or do not exist.
Such jury input would not appear to be required under this Court's decision in Proflitt."
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C. Burden on the Right to a Jury Trial
Yet another issue raised by the Ohio death penalty statutes is
whether they place an unconstitutional burden on the right to trial
by jury. The argument that they do stems from the fact that the Ohio
procedure requires sentence to be set by the trial judge alone if the
defendant is tried by a jury, but by a three-judge panel if the defen-
dant waives his right to a jury trial.264 If the decision is made by a
three-judge panel, all three judges must concur upon a lack of mitiga-
tion before the death sentence can be imposed. 265  Thus, under the
Ohio statutes, the defendant who chooses to be tried by a three-
judge panel will have three chances to succeed in proving his claim
of mitigation, but a defendant tried by a jury will have only one chance.
The argument just made finds further support in the United States
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Jackson.2 66 Jackson in-
volved a constitutional attack on the Federal Kidnapping Act,267 un-
der which death was an available punishment, but only a jury could
impose the death sentence. The statute contained no procedure for
imposing the death sentence on one who waived his right to a jury trial
or upon one who pleaded guilty. The statutory scheme was held to be
unconstitutional because it "makes the 'risk of death' the price for as-
serting the right to jury trial, and thereby 'impairs .. . free exercise'
of a constitutional right." '268
On its face, Jackson might appear distinguishable because in Jack-
son the death sentence clearly was available only when a jury tried the
case; the death sentence was never available when a judge tried the
case. Under the Ohio scheme the death sentence is available whether
or not a jury tries the case. The impairment of the right to jury trial
arises because a defendant has a lesser chance to prevail in his attempt
to establish mitigation of sentence when he exercises his right to a jury
trial than when he waives that right.
Although it is true that the issue in Jackson involved an absolute
imposition or removal of a burden-rather than the degree of burden
being imposed-on the exercise of the right to a jury trial, much of the
Court's opinion suggests that the absoluteness of the burden was not
the determinative factor. Indeed, the government had argued that the
Kidnapping Act did permit the trial judge to impose the death sen-
tence, but that, in order to do so, he was required to commence a
special hearing for that purpose. The Court responded:
Even if the Government's statutory position were correct, the fact
264. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(C) (Page 1975).
265. Id. § 2929.03(E).
266. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
267. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964).
268. 390 U.S. at 571.
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would remain that the defendant convicted on a guilty plea or by a judge
completely escapes the threat of capital punishment unless the trial judge
makes an affirmative decision to commence a penalty hearing and to im-
panel a special jury for that purpose, whereas the defendant convicted by
a jury automatically incurs a risk that the same jury will recommend the
death penalty and that the judge will accept its recommendation. 69
What the Court seemed to focus on was whether there was any
need for the burden imposed. The Court asserted that "t]he question
is not whether the chilling effect is 'incidental' rather than intentional;
the question is whether that effect is unnecessary and therefore exces-
sive." 270  The Court pointed out that there were alternative sentencing
schemes available that would effectuate Congress' purposes,171 but not
impose a burden on the exercise of the right to jury trial. The Court
concluded:
Given the availability of this and other alternatives, it is clear that the
selective death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act cannot
be justified by its ostensible purpose. Whatever the power of Congress
to impose a death penalty for violation of the Federal Kidnapping Act,
Congress cannot impose such a penalty in a manner that needlessly pe-
nalizes the assertion of a constitutional right.2 7
Thus, under a careful reading of Jackson, the issue would not
be whether the Ohio statute imposes an absolute burden on the
exercise of the right to a jury trial that is not imposed when that right
is waived, but rather whether the burden imposed-though different only
in degree from that otherwise imposed-is a justifiable one.73
The Ohio Supreme Court faced this issue in State v. Bell. 2
74
The court recognized that the Ohio statute differed from the statute
considered in Jackson: "[W]e are confronted with only the arguably
greater possibility of the avoidance of the death penalty by the require-
269. Id. at 573 n.6.
270. Id. at 582.
271. The Government argued that the statute, by giving the jury discretion to grant
mercy, avoided "the more drastic alternative of mandatory capital punishment in csery case.
In this sense, the selective death penalty procedure established by the Federal Kidnapping Act
may be viewed as ameliorating the severity of the more extreme punishment that Congress might
have wished to provide." Id. at 581-82.
272. Id. at 582-83.
273. See Chaffin v. Styncheombe, 412 U.S. 17, 30 (1973) (The Court [in Jackson] found
that the interest of the Government in having the jury retain the power to render the death
penalty could be realized without this imposition on the rights of the accused. Therefore, the
sentencing structure of the statute was struck down because it 'unnecssarily and *needlessly
chill[ed] the exercise of basic constitutional rights.' "); Oregon v. Mitchell. 400 U.S. 112. 23
(1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting and concurring) ('Of course, governmental action that has the
incidental effect of burdening the exercise of a constitutional right is not ipso facto uncon-
stitutional. But in such a case, governmental action may withstand constitutional scrutiny
only upon a clear showing that the burden is necessary to protect a compelling and substantial
governmental interest. . . . United States r. Jackson . . ").
274. 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 358 N.E.2d 556 (1976), cen. granted 97 S. Ct. 2971 (1977). The
same issue was addressed in State v. Weind, 50 Ohio St. 2d 224, 229, 364 N.E.2d 224, 229. as
well as a related Jackson attack, not addressed in this Comment. Id. at 227, 364 N.E.2d at 228.
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ment of unanimity within the panel, and not with its absolute avoid-
ance as in Jackson.,275  The court made three arguments in defense
of the statute. The first argument was as follows:
Although appellant asserts that there is a greater possibility of con-
vincing one of three judges on a panel of a mitigating factor than one
judge alone, by the same logic, there is also a greater possibility of con-
vincing one or more of 12 jurors of the absence of evidence of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt than so convincing one of three judges. If
the first consideration inclines against a jury trial, then the latter inclines
toward one.276
Of course, the exact argument could have been made about the Kid-
napping Act in Jackson. This sort of argument, if accepted, would
seem to validate any burden on the exercise of the right to jury trial so
long as the defendant could escape the burden by not being convicted
in the first place.
The second argument made in support of the statute was that the
statute serves only to give the defendant a choice. In the court's
opinion, there was:
nothing unreasonable or coercive in the statute: there are pros and cons
with respect to each alternative. If a defendant feels uncomfortable
with a jury as the trier of fact at trial and the trial judge as the trier of
fact at the mitigation hearing, then he may elect a three-judge panel as
the trier of fact for all the proceedings.
7
It is difficult to see how this argument answers the contention that Ohio's
statute imposes a burden on choosing a jury trial. It is true that the
United States Supreme Court has said that "Jackson did not hold, as
subsequent decisions have made clear, that the Constitution forbids
every government-imposed choice in the criminal process that has the
effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights." '  But the
Court has never held that a burden on a constitutional right is permis-
sible merely because a choice is given to the defendant, along with the
burden. The issue is still "whether compelling the election impairs to
an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved." '79
The third argument made by the Ohio Supreme Court was that
statistics showed that "this statutory scheme does not coerce or impel
a defendant to waive jury trial."'28  At least the court was presented
with no contrary evidence. But the United States Supreme Court in
Jackson stated that "the evil in the . . . statute is not that it necessarily
275. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 275, 358 N.E.2d at 561.
276. Id. at 275-76, 358 N.E.2d at 561.
277. Id. at 276, 358 N.E.2d at 561.
278. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 30 (1973).
279. Id.
280. State v. Bell, 48 Ohio St. 2d at 276, 358 N.E.2d at 562.
[Vol. 38:617
1977] DEATH PENALTY
coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers but simply that it needlessly
encourages them." 28' While statistical evidence has been required in
some contexts,28 2 Jackson would not seem to require such proof. In
Jackson, the "coercion" to waive the right to jury trial was felt to be
"the inevitable effect" of the sentencing scheme.8 3
To support its holding, the Ohio Supreme Court might have
found that the "incidentar' burden on the right to jury trial was justi-
fied by some substantial governmental interest. 284  Or it might have
noted that Jackson has not been consistently or widely applied, and
tried to liken the Ohio procedure to some other procedures upheld by
the United States Supreme Court against a Jackson attack.2 5 But
the court undertook no such analysis, contenting itself instead with a
shallow and unpersuasive defense of the statute.
In the final analysis, what should matter in deciding this issue
is the nature of the competing interests. When life or death is the
determination to be made, procedural regularity and utmost fairness
should be of ultimate coficern. The court offered no persuasive rea-
son to justify requiring some defendants-those who choose a jury trial
-to be sentenced by one individual, but other defendants-those who
281. 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968).
282. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (defendant may be given
heavier sentence on retrial than at original trial, but heavier sentence cannot be imposed out of
vindictiveness toward the defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction on
constitutional grounds. Vindictiveness may be shown by statistical evidence.)
283. 390 U.S. at 581.
284. The court gave no rationale for the sentencing scheme. When the death penalty
scheme was first being considered by the Ohio Senate, the bill provided that a panel of three
judges would set sentence for every defendant, even if he were tried by a jury. Am. Sub. H.B.
No. 511 § 2901.94(A), 109th Gen'l Assembly (1971-72). That provision was changed in con-
ference to its present form. 134 OHio HoUsE JOURNAL 2467 (1972).
Aside from administrative convenience, another reason for the change was suggested by
Lehman & Norris, supra note 73, at 22: "The theory that brought about this result was recog-
nition of the fact that the two additional judges would not have the benefit of the evidence
given at trial, and the hearing on the issue of mitigation could result in a retrial of the case in
its entirety." This, to some extent, is a variation on the administrative convenience rationale.
285. See, e.g., Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 54 (1974), in which Jackson was character-
ized as involving a statute which "'had no other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of
constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them.'" The quote the
Fuller Court used is taken out of context from the Jackson opinion. The Court in Jackson %%ent
on to say that the Federal Kidnapping Act was not such a statute, since the sentencing scheme
embodied in it ostensibly served another governmental objective.
For cases in which a Jackson argument was rejected, see, e.g., Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40
(1974) (state recoupment statute requiring defendant who was indigent at the time of trial but
who later became financially able to pay, to reimburse the state for attorney's fees of appointed
counsel held not to infringe defendant's right to counsel); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe. 412 U.S. 17
(1973) (heavier sentence after retrial than received at first trial does not burden the right to
challenge the first conviction); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (upheld sentence
imposed under state statute which provided that jury could impose death, but highest penalty
available upon plea of guilty was life imprisonment); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742
(1970) (guilty plea under same statute as that in Jackson entered nine years before Jackson
was decided held not invalid since not coerced by fear of death); Parker v. North Carolina, 397
U.S. 790 (1970) (state statute allowing heavier penalty to be given by a jury after conviction than
upon a plea of guilty held not to vitiate the defendant's plea of guilty even though imposition
of death by a jury under such a scheme may have been unconstitutional).
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waive their right to a jury trial-to be sentenced by three individuals.
If the state has no substantial interest in distinguishing in this manner
between these two classes of defendants, it is clifficult to see what
justification there can be for gratuitously imposing a burden-however
slight-on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial.286
CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court of the United States decides State v. Bell
and State v. Sandra Lockett, it will be faced with a host of constitu-
tional questions raised by the statutes under which Bell and Lockett
were sentenced to death.287  The answers to these questions must be
derived from a careful analysis of the legal principles involved and a
deep appreciation of the momentous decision to be made. The Court
will receive little guidance from the pronouncements of the Ohio
Supreme Court, which are too often shallow, evasive, or indefensible.
In its attempt to salvage Ohio's death penalty scheme, the Ohio
Supreme Court has slighted substantial constitutional questions, the
solutions to which will have a critical impact on those who have been
or will be sentenced to death in Ohio.
No matter what one believes about the merits of the death
penalty, certainly no one would disagree that the decision to take the
life of a human being in the name of justice is one of such gravity
286. Cf James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972 (state recoupment statute permitting
state to bring civil action against indigent defendants for reimbursement of legal defense fees
of appointed counsel struck down since it failed to provide protective exemptions given to other
civil judgment debtors); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (state may not provide fewer
procedural or substantive safeguards for an accused committed to a mental institution prior to
trial, because of incapacity to stand trial, than for individuals committed through civil com-
mitment proceedings); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) (struck down statutory pro-
cedure permitting prisoners to be civilly committed upon expiration of prison sentence without
procedural or substantive safeguards given to others civilly committed).
287. It is quite possible that the United States Supreme Court will not reach some of the
issues discussed in this Comment since not all these issues were raised by Bell or Lockett at
trial or on appeal. Moreover, recent events seem to indicate that the Court may strike down
Ohio's death penalty statute as applied to Bell and/or Lockett rather than on its face. In
Richmond v. Arizona, in which the defendant attacked Arizona's death penalty scheme, the
Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari despite the fact that the Arizona scheme
is quite similar to that of Ohio. Richmond then sought to suspend effect of the order denying
certiorari or to stay his execution. Justice Rehnquist, acting in his capacity as Circuit Justice
for the Ninth Circuit, denied Richmond's requests:
The Ohio and Arizona death penalty statutes are similar in that their lists of mitigating
circumstances do not include such factors as age and lack of prior criminal convic-
tions, which are included in the Florida statute approved in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242 (1976). Applicant, unlike Bell however, does not allege that he would be aided by an
expansion of the statutory list of mitigating circumstances. The p-tition in Bell pointed
out that the defendant was 16 at the time of the penalty trial, had a low IQ, was con-
sidered emotionally immature and abnormal, had cooperated with the police, and had
no significant history of prior criminal activity. What evidence is alluded to in the ap-
plicant's papers does not suggest that any of the factors that applicant contends must be
considered in imposing capital punishment would be relevant to his ease.
21 CRISI. L. REp. 4129 (BNA 1977). Moreover, the Court's recent grant of certiorari in State v,
Sandra Lockett, 98 S. Ct. 261 (1977) (discussed in text accompanying notes 202-11 suipra), sug-
gests that the outcome in Bell will not dictate the result in Sandra Lockett.
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that it should be made only with the greatest care and circumspection.
It is deeply regrettable that the Supreme Court of Ohio, in perform-
ing its decisive role in capital cases, has not employed the high stan-
dards commensurate with the solemnity of the decisions to be made.
Susan M. Kuzma

